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It is important to understand the factors leading to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party’s (PKK) 
foundation to take the necessary steps to avoid current and new terrorist activities in 
Turkey. This thesis research examines three main incentives that led to the PKK’s 
creation and continuation beyond any governmental policies or colonial arguments. 
Besides many others there are three main instruments through which the PKK found the 
means to start and develop an armed campaign: Turkey’s political atmosphere in the 
1960s, 1970s and 1980s; Abdullah Öcalan, the leader of the PKK; and foreign ambitions 
over Turkey. The main objective of this thesis is to find out what has made the PKK 
unique and what sets it apart from other illegal organizations and terrorist groups. A 
study of the origins of the group and its leader, this thesis demonstrates the PKK’s ability 
to orient itself to the shifting environment in Turkey and in the world, and how it 
benefited from the chaotic atmosphere of Turkey during its foundation years. Successive 
chapters will touch upon the group’s leader Abdullah Öcalan as well as the countries that 
supported the PKK. The conclusion will suggest possible long-term peace and stability 
solutions that Turkey might take.  
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 THE AIM OF THE THESIS A.
The Turkish government has recently announced, in connection with the PKK 
(The Kurdistan Workers’ Party/Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan) leadership, an agreement 
that will end the thirty-year struggle with the PKK. The first official meetings started in 
September 2008 in Oslo/Norway and continued in 2009. The current Secretary of the 
National Intelligence Organization (MIT), Hakan Fidan, took part in an August 2009 
meeting in Oslo.1 Before the Constitution Plebiscite of 2009, Prime Minister Recep 
Tayyip Erdogan accepted the Oslo Meeting’s results and declared, “Yes, there are people 
meeting with the PKK, in order to solve this issue [the PKK problem]; they can meet 
even with [Abdullah] Öcalan.”2 But what kinds of political, military and social policies 
are likely to be necessary to allow this ceasefire to succeed when many previous 
ceasefires have failed?  This thesis argues that the first step in helping to bring a 
permanent end to the PKK threat is to begin to understand the nature of that threat in the 
first place. 
The aim of this thesis is to explore the foundation phase of the PKK terrorist 
organization that occurred between the late 1960s and the mid-1980s. The PKK managed 
to emerge as the most influential and longest lasting Kurdish nationalist and separatist 
movement in Turkey among many other leftist or Kurdish separatist organizations. What 
factors in the PKK’s creation and development distinguish it from other terrorist 
organizations?  What specifically in its formative years sets it apart? What made the PKK 
so successful over such a long period of time?  
                                                
1 “PKK Ilk Kez Açikladi...Oslo’Da Neler Oldu?” Aksam Gazetesi, April 24, 2013. 
http://www.aksam.com.tr/siyaset/pkk-ilk-kez-acikladiosloda-neler-oldu/haber-199057. 
2 Ibid.  
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 THE IMPORTANCE OF UNDERSTANDING THE CAUSES THAT B.
PROMOTED PKK’S EXISTENCE 
For more than three decades, the PKK has been at the forefront of Turkish 
politics. Mostly after 1984, the PKK caused thousands of civilian and security forces 
causalities and cost Turkey billions of dollars. In order to put an end to this bloody low 
intensity conflict, first we have to understand what the PKK is. Without comprehending 
its roots, one cannot completely understand the foundation and drive of the PKK terrorist 
organization.  
In addition to casualties and its economic impact, the PKK terror campaign has 
also generated obstacles for Turkey in the international field.3 Both the PKK and 
Turkey’s neighbors that have problems with Ankara have benefited from an opportunistic 
partnership. Greece, Syria and Iraq have used the PKK as an extension of their foreign 
policy against Turkey. Accordingly, the PKK has gained financial, protective and training 
support from these countries. 
From time to time the PKK has flinched, but at the first opportunity it resumed its 
campaign of terror. There are many factors that contributed to the foundation of and 
continue to nurture the PKK organization. These factors range from domestic policies to 
foreign support. While Turkey succeeded in her persistent struggle by using armed forces 
to limit the level of PKK violence after 1997, the government could not find an effective 
long-term solution to the ongoing fighting. Even while losing numerous members or 
lacking the support of sponsors the PKK managed to survive. The PKK persisted even 
after security forces captured the party leader, Abdullah Öcalan, in Kenya in 1999.  
The PKK is counted as one of the most dangerous terrorist organizations in the 
world and recognized as a terrorist organization not only by Turkey but also by the 
European Union and the United States. Yet despite the prolonged history and scale of its 
violence, the PKK is still an enigma. The PKK has gone through a number of mutations 
and evolutions. Starting as a leftist political group, the PKK also contained elements of a 
nationalist and ethnic insurgency. “The PKK’s original goal was to establish an 
                                                
3 While Turkey has Cyprus, FIR (Flight information) and continental shelf problems with Greece, it 
also has water issues with Syria and Iraq. 
 3 
independent Kurdish state in southeastern Turkey, but in recent years it has spoken more 
often about autonomy within a Turkish state that guarantees Kurdish cultural and 
linguistic rights.”4 Recently it has become more Islamist in orientation, and has at times 
claimed to be a pan-Kurdish organization. And throughout its existence, the PKK has 
been largely driven by its leader, Öcalan, even after his capture. This thesis argues that 
despite these many permutations, the most important way to understand the dynamics of 
the PKK organization is by exploring its roots. This research focuses on those roots in 
order to identify strategies for understanding the motivation of the PKK members and the 
ideology that holds the followers together. 
The aim of this thesis is to emphasize what made the PKK different from other 
organizations and which factors helped its birth and development. When compared with 
other leftist and Kurdish nationalist groups, the PKK has been more successful in 
developing and continuing its armed struggle because it adapted to changes both inside 
and outside of Turkey. The PKK’s leader, Abdullah Öcalan, directed the organization 
without any opposition due to his tyranny and undisputed governance. He followed the 
way of leftist and/or nationalist vanguards at first, but changed the Party’s direction 
according to the shifts in politics and international arena. He took advantage of the 
political chaos of the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s to recruit new members and organized the 
leadership and armed cadres.  
At the inception of the PKK, the Turkish government was reluctant to allow for 
cultural differences or give more freedom to the Kurdish population to avoid ethnic 
abuses because leaders worried about the unity of the country. Moreover, such freedoms 
might trigger the separation of not only eastern Anatolia but also Armenian demands for 
control of the border territory between the two countries. Öcalan used Turkey’s 
predicament to provoke the Kurdish community against the government and convinced 
some of them about the necessity of the armed struggle. 
When the 12 September 1980 Coup struck, of all the marginal groups from both 
left and right, the PKK cadre was affected most. On the other hand, Öcalan established 
                                                
4  Country Reports on Terrorism 2012 (Washington, DC: United States Department of State 
Publication, Bureau of Counterterrorism). www.state.gov/documents/organization/210204.pdf. 
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connections with Palestinian and Lebanese groups, and those who managed to escape 
were trained and fed in their camps. While Syria and Iraq supported militants’ infiltration 
to Turkey, Russia offered weapons and ammunition for the armed struggle. In addition to 
financial support, European countries gave political encouragement to the PKK. With the 
help of international support, the PKK returned to Turkey stronger than before and took 
advantage of the absence of rival groups’ that had been crushed by the military forces 
after the coup.  
Another factor that comforted the PKK was Ankara’s perspective about the threat. 
The Turkish government underestimated the PKK and introduced the group as “bunch of 
bandits.” This irony encouraged PKK’s development and helped Öcalan to gain ground 
in the rural areas of eastern Anatolia. Despite the assessment by Ankara that possible 
terrorist activity would happen in rural areas, the PKK grew in mountainous regions 
especially in Hakkari and Siirt. Once managed to recruit adequate members to fight and 
settled into the mountainous territory of the eastern Anatolia, Öcalan was convinced that 
the PKK was ready for a long-term popular war and ordered the 1984 Eruh raid that 
started PKK’s armed struggle against Turkish security forces. 
It is important to understand the stimulus for the PKK’s founding, make 
comparisons between past and current Turkey, and take the necessary steps to avoid new 
terrorist activities. Recent developments show that other terrorist organizations are ready 
to take the place of the PKK. During the dissolution of the PKK that started at the 
beginning of 2013, the Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party-Front (DHKP-C) began 
its activities once again. First, on February 2, 2013, the DHKP-C attacked the U.S. 
Embassy in Ankara.5 Second, on March 19, 2013, the DHKP-C claimed responsibility for 
the attack against the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) headquarters and 
Justice Ministry aiming to damage the ongoing resolution process between the Turkish 
                                                
5 “DHKP/C Claims Responsibility for the Attack on U.S. Embassy.” Hurryiet Daily News. 
http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/dhkpc-claims-responsibility-for-the-attack-on-us-
embassy.aspx?pageID=238&nID=40308&NewsCatID=341 (accessed May 19, 2013). 
 5 
government and the PKK.6 DHKP-C’s recent activities demonstrate that Turkey’s terror 
problem is not yet solved. If the government cannot avoid the circumstances that give rise 
to new insurgencies, Turkey will continue to spend its resources fighting terrorism. Once 
more, one can understand that unsolved democratic, social and economic problems in 
Turkey will create new terrorist organizations or sustain the old ones.  
 SCHOLARS’ WAY OF HANDLING THE PKK PHENOMENON C.
The cliché “One man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter”7 best resembles 
the trouble that anybody faces when working on terrorism. Research on the PKK requires 
a clear definition of terrorism because governments structure their view of terrorism 
according to their understanding of terrorism. In fact, academia and government organs 
have failed to reveal a single definition of terrorism that is accepted generally. Moreover, 
while the definition of the term “terrorism” continues to be vague, it is difficult to find an 
unbiased source about the PKK organization. Thus, there has been an ongoing debate 
over the explanation of the PKK insurgency. Existing literature about the PKK is mostly 
subjective because even though it is one of the bloodiest terrorist organizations in the 
Middle East, it is perhaps the least frequently studied. The PKK phenomenon has become 
more sophisticated and more complicated due to fact that it is still an ongoing 
organization. Any literature related to the study of the PKK is therefore open to 
manipulation for the purposes of propaganda and agitation by the government as well as 
PKK proponents. Even so, examining both parties’ claims would be valuable to 
understand the PKK dynamics objectively. 
Aliza Marcus is one of the few non-Turkish journalists that write about the PKK. 
In her book Blood and Belief: The PKK and the Kurdish Fight for Independence, she 
explains the PKK’s “popularity” by identifying the organization with the Kurdish 
community’s positive perception of PKK objectives. Marcus believes the PKK 
insurgency was a method for putting the Kurdish problem on the agenda in Turkey. In 
                                                
6  “Double Bomb Attack in Ankara Targets ‘Resolution Process’: Turkish PM Erdoğan.” Hurriyet 
Daily News. http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/double-bomb-attack-in-ankara-targets-resolution-process-
turkish-pm-Erdoğan.aspx?pageID=238&nID=43362&NewsCatID=338 (accessed 5/19/2013). 
7  Gerald Seymour, Harry’s Game: A Novel (New York: Random House, 1975). 
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addition, she identifies the movement as a way for Kurds to define themselves as Kurds 
who have a history that has honor.8  Her book is invaluable because its content is shaped 
by interviews with former and current PKK terrorists, most of whom are outside of 
Turkey. However, because her sources are one sided, her book is not objective. She 
admits this at the beginning and at the end of her book, but she argues that by using such 
an approach, she could get detailed information for the first time directly from PKK 
terrorists without relying on Turkish army statements. Thus, Marcus sees her work as a 
success despite its bias.9  
Dirilişin Öyküsü (The History of Revival) by Yalçın Küçük and Apo ve PKK (Apo 
and the PKK) by Mehmet Ali Birand give readers a broad understanding of Öcalan’s 
background and how he shaped the PKK organization in the 1970s. These books consist 
of interviews made with Abdullah Öcalan. Many scholars have long embraced these two 
books as effective looks into the mentality of Öcalan in his own words. Küçük is a PKK 
sympathizer, so Birand’s Apo10 and the PKK appears more objective. However, both 
books are used by academics in their research, whether they are pro-PKK or side with the 
government. 
It is easy to understand how one’s perception of Turkey, Atatürk and the PKK 
campaign is changed by reading Pirim’s Ömerli Köyünden İmralıya: PKK’nın 20 Yıllık 
Öyküsü (From Omerli Village to Imrali: PKK’s Story of Two Decades). Oktay Pirim 
helps us to analyze the evaluation of Öcalan’s discourse by including his plea that he 
made in the court after his capture. Rather than making a counter-argument, Öcalan 
prefers to present a solution to the ongoing struggle and finds the solution in democratic 
means. Pirim himself gives broad information about the PKK history, its creation and 
development, but more importantly, the reader can find the chief public prosecutor Nuh 
Mete Yüksel’s indictment that represents official insight of the PKK. Thus, combining 
authors,’ officials’ and Öcalan’s interpretation of the PKK phenomenon offers a valuable 
                                                
8  Aliza Marcus, Blood and Belief: The PKK and the Kurdish Fight for Independence (New York: 
New York University Press, 2007), 305. 
9 Ibid. 
10 A diminutive for Abdullah; the word also means ‘uncle’ in Kurdish. 
 7 
opportunity for scholars who want to understand the motivations of the terrorist 
organization.  
Emin Demirel accepts the PKK as “a Marxist-Leninist and separatist terrorist 
organization,” but claims that the PKK is a continuation of the Kurdish disaffection that 
started long before 1960. His work, From Past to Present: The PKK and Insurgencies, is 
important because the book gives a detailed background of the separatist movements 
dating back to the foundation of the Turkish Republic. The book helps scholars to 
understand the origins of the Kurdish uprisings. At the end of the book Demirel proposes 
a military solution: a cross-border operation to the PKK camps in the Northern Iraq to 
end PKK violence and maintain Turkey’s integrity. However, Demirel’s military solution 
does not satisfy readers, unless the civilian wing that would bring a permanent peace in 
the region supports such a cross-border operation’s aftermath.11  
Nihat Ali Özcan handles Turkey’s counterterrorism policy from a different 
perspective. Özcan notices that even though Turkey became militarily successful in 
combating terrorism, it lacks an academic framework that brings past terror experience 
into the present. Consequently, he defines the terrorism perception of the government as: 
“Terror and counter-terrorism is a social incident that should be worked through the view 
of sociologic, economic, cultural, physiologic, political and historic occasion that must 
not be analyzed solely as a criminal and military event.”12       
Besides the motivation for terrorism, Özcan explains foreign support by studying 
countries one by one and illuminating the PKK’s political extension in the European 
Union. Özcan successfully links PKK’s strategy with Öcalan’s ideology. In explaining 
PKK’s philosophy, Özcan highlights how different movements of thought in the 1970s 
influenced Öcalan and how he in turn shaped the character of the PKK. Whereas Özcan 
gives comprehensive information about the mental dynamics of the organization, he falls 
short in suggesting a solution to the PKK campaign.  
                                                
11  Emin Demirel, Geçmisten Günümüze PKK Ve Ayaklanmalar (Istanbul: IQ Kültür Sanat, 2005), 
313. 
12  Nihat Ali O ̈zcan, PKK (Ku ̈rdistan I ̇s ̧c ̧i Partisi) Tarihi, Ideolojisi, Ve Yo ̈ntemi (Ankara: Avrasya 
Stratejik Aras ̧tırmalar Merkezi Yayınları, 1999), VII. 
 8 
Another important piece of literature that specifically addresses PKK’s outside 
connections is Andrew Mango’s book, Turkey and the War on Terror: For Forty Years 
We Fought Alone. Mango was born in Istanbul and spent forty years working for the 
BBC World Service’s Turkey unit, so his book is a respected source written in English by 
someone who knows Turkey very well.  
Mango describes international counterterrorism measures, signed by the states 
that include PKK’s sponsors, stated and approved: the United Nations conventions of 
1963 and the EU conventions concluded at Strasbourg in 1977. Then he seeks to 
understand why some states support the PKK with political and economic aid. He notes, 
“If ‘all states’ had faithfully carried out these duties [The UN anti-terrorism resolutions], 
Turkey would have been spared the human and material losses incurred over 30 years in 
its struggle with terror.”13 
Mango’s contribution is crucial because understanding international dynamics 
that sustain the PKK’s existence explains why the PKK grew so big in Turkey.  
Besides dealing with other incentives, in his book The PKK: a Report on 
Separatist Violence in Turkey İsmet G. İsmet gives more emphasize to Turkish internal 
dynamics between 1978 and 1982. He accuses the administration of 1980 of “ignoring 
the real origins of terrorist activities.”14 In addition, he highlights the government’s 
unpreparedness for the rural campaign because of Ankara’s overconfidence arising from 
the 1980 military coup. He notes that by thinking all illegal activities ended and that there 
was no other threat to the stability of the country, Ankara relaxed and could not recognize 
the growing threat of the PKK. Thus, the initials of the PKK went somewhat unnoticed 
by the Turkish government. Such unawareness served to help the PKK through its days 
of intensive preparations for launching attacks on Turkey. Arguing that the year 1980 was 
a “turning point” for the PKK, İsmet claims that if the government had noticed the PKK 
movements beforehand, Turkey could have prevented the flight of crucial PKK leaders to 
                                                
13  Andrew Mango, Turkey and the War on Terror: For Forty Years we Fought Alone (London, New 
York: Routledge, 2005), 75. 
14  I ̇smet G. I ̇mset, The PKK: A Report on Separatist Violence in Turkey, 1973–1992 (Kavaklıdere, 
Ankara: Turkish Daily News, 1992), 3. 
 9 
foreign safe-havens, and by taking necessary economic and social measures, the 
government could have prevented PKK violence from the very beginning.15   
Three academics, Bekir Çakar, Mahmut Cengiz and Fatih Tombul, try to clarify 
the problems related to the roots of the PKK by examining the Kurdish origin, language 
and religion. In this sense, their study presents the history of the Kurds, explains the 
PKK’s emergence and describes its structure, ideology and strategy. They define the 
Kurdish question as “largely a product of the modern Turkish state” and date the PKK 
phenomenon back to the 1950s. The authors argue that after the shift from the single 
party era to the multiparty system, the new government of the Democratic Party (DP) 
provided more individual freedoms, human rights and democracy that satisfied the 
Kurdish community. However, the 1960 coup and its products caused significant 
disappointment and raised frictions that led to illegal outfits like the PKK.16    
This work also provides necessary data derived from different surveys made by 
the BILGESAM Institute in various years.17 The tables that provide the results of “the 
PKK support, reasons of terrorism, and reasons of joining PKK terrorist organization” 
provide substantial information about the viewpoints of the Turkish (including Kurdish) 
people regarding the PKK campaign. According to the authors, in 1980s two main 
objectives of the organization were to be the representative of the Kurdish citizens of 
Turkey and to establish a free and Marxist Kurdish state in some parts of Anatolia. 
However, the Kurdish people did not embrace Marxist ideology, so rather than 
ideological reasons, economic circumstances and PKK’s violent oppression forced some 
Kurdish people to support the PKK campaign. Despite everything, the PKK has never 
gained majority support of the Kurdish community in its bloody war.18  
                                                
15 Ibid, 31. 
16  Charles B. Strozier and James Frank, The PKK: Financial Sources, Social and Political 
Dimensions (Saarbru ̈cken: VDM Verlag Dr Mu ̈ller, 2011), 6. 
17  BILGESAM is a private company located in Istanbul. The purpose of BILGESAM is to make 
predictions for the future by closely following developments in Turkey and in the World. To accomplish 
this task, the BILGESAM conducts scientific research on bilateral and multilateral relations and the 
security strategies of Turkey, as well as on domestic problems in political, economic, technological, 
environmental, and socio-cultural areas.  
18  Ali Kemal O ̈zcan, Turkey’s Kurds: A Theoretical Analysis of the PKK and Abdullah O ̈calan 
(London, New York: Routledge, 2006), 231. 
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“Although the PKK at its outset considered itself a defender and advocate of 
Kurdish nationalism, it adopted a Marxist–Leninist ideology tinged with the Stalinist 
leadership model and a Maoist strategy for seeking power. Despite its attempts to conceal 
itself in Kurdish nationalism, since the PKK’s inception Marxism has defined its genuine 
ideology.”19 Therefore, the PKK has never managed to gain vast majority support from 
the majority of Kurdish citizens.  
After examining all the aforementioned arguments, one can still have doubts 
about the incentives that contributed to PKK’s emergence. The authors discussed in this 
section accept that many factors contributed to the organization’s existence, but each of 
them emphasizes different dynamics. The PKK campaign has continued for more than 
thirty years, and its structure has evolved over time. Thus, connecting its starting point to 
only one factor would be misleading. On the other hand, the literature is useful in that it 
contributes to our knowledge more generally of the leveraging arguments, Turkey’s 
social environment, PKK’s leader and foreign support. Overall, one can find valuable 
information from the sources as to why the PKK gained support and grew.  
 RECENT DEVELOPMENTS INVOLVING THE PKK INSIDE TURKEY D.
The group was found in 1974, but was formally established as the PKK in 1978. 
Today, the PKK is not as dangerous as it was in the early 1990s, and its ability to carry 
out large-scale attacks in Turkey has greatly diminished due to the peace process that has 
been handled by the Turkish government since 2012. However, the PKK holds the ability 
to conduct attacks on targets in southeastern Anatolia. As part of its two-front strategy, 
the PKK also conducts urban bombing campaigns in metropolitan areas of Turkey, 
primarily targeting socially and economically important figures. 
“Blending Marxism and theories about class struggle on the one hand, with the 
romanticism inherent in national self-determination movements on the other, the PKK 
shifted its political objectives over time. Its goals have ranged from the establishment of 
an independent Kurdish state, to an autonomous Kurdistan, to a truly democratic Turkey 
                                                
19  Mitchel P. Roth and Murat Sever, “The Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) as Criminal Syndicate: 
Funding Terrorism through Organized Crime, A Case Study,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 30, no. 10 
(09/18; 2013/08, 2007). doi:10.1080/10576100701558620, 4.  
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in which the Kurds would have equal rights and freedom.”20 Consequently, many 
scholars and authorities categorize it as a ‘national-separatist’ terrorist organization. 
The PKK and its violent campaign against Turkey have claimed more than 30,000 
victims, including both Turkish and Kurdish citizens. However, in its prolonged fight the 
PKK could achieve little, isolating comrades and supporters by its deliberate dogmatism 
and infuriating, threatening and uncompromising conflict by state authorities and the 
military in response to its habitual violent activities.  
While the PKK is designated as a terrorist organization by many countries and 
organizations, including the EU and the U.S., it is also responsible for criminal activities 
like drug and human trafficking, money laundering, fraud and credit card skimming to 
fund its armed struggle and other political extensions.  
Abdullah Öcalan, the founder and leader of the PKK, remains responsible for the 
overall strategy of the PKK, communicating with the organization through his lawyers, 
despite his imprisonment on Imrali Island. Still PKK members perceive him as their 
president and act accordingly. “The capture and imprisonment of Abdullah Öcalan in 
February 1999 came at a time when the Turkish security forces had already gained the 
upper hand on the battlefield through the forced evacuation of villages to deprive the 
PKK of logistical support from the local population, aggressive patrolling, and the use of 
Cobra helicopters for hot pursuit. In August 1999, Öcalan announced an indefinite 
unilateral ceasefire and ordered all PKK units inside Turkey to leave the country prior to 
the organization pursuing its goals by political rather than military means. In May 2004, 
he ordered the PKK to resume its armed campaign starting from 1 June 2004.”21  
Since 1 June 2004, the PKK tried to secure the release of its leader Öcalan. At the 
same time it continued to control the Kurdish uprising in Turkey. “In southeast Turkey, it 
has adopted a policy of attrition, concentrating on harassing the Turkish security forces 
                                                
20  Lyubov Grigorova and Ted Robert Gurr, Crime-Terror Alliances and the State: Ethnonationalist 
and Islamist Challenges to Regional Security (London, New York: Routledge, 2013). 
21  “Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan (PKK),” IHS Janes, Jane’s World Insurgency and Terrorism, no. 1 
(December 18, 2012), 1–44. 
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through ambushes, landmines and sniper fire, as well as conducting bomb attacks on 
infrastructure in rural areas.”22  
The PKK’s returning to the scene after Öcalan’s capture might seem confusing. 
On the other hand the year 2004, when the PKK once more took the active fighting 
decision, is not arbitrary. In 2003, the group found a second chance to act freely in the 
Iraqi region after the 1991 Gulf War. “Operation Provide Comfort (OPC) and the no-fly 
zone is believed to have facilitated the power vacuum created in northern Iraq, creating a 
safe haven for the PKK there, enabling their terrorist campaigns since then.”23 Lieutenant 
General Hasan Kundakcı (Commander of the Southeastern Region Gendarmerie, 1993–
1995) summarizes the issue as follows:  
“Whenever the U.S. entered Iraq, it helped the PKK, and hurt us. Particularly 
during the second Gulf War, it enabled the PKK to gain significant strength. Turkey was 
among the most hurt from the second Gulf War. Barzani, Talabani and the PKK gained a 
lot from U.S. operations. The U.S., unfortunately, in its effort to create the ‘Greater 
Middle East Project’ and protect its own interests, helped them.”24 
The second Gulf crisis created a semi-autonomous Kurdistan in northern Iraq. 
However, an independent Kurdish state carved out of Iraq is not in Turkey’s national 
interest, because it would be a threat to the regional balance of power.  
The PKK declared a “Self Defense War” against Turkey on 1 February 2003. Its 
decision was confirmed by Öcalan’s 2004 declaration The PKK increased the violence 
incrementally between 2003 and 2006. Its new strategy was to establish suicide 
bombings, creating Special Forces inside the mountain cadre and restarting retaliation 
activities against security forces. From 2002 to 2003 the PKK doubled its activities. The 
                                                
22 “Kurdish Separatists Renew Military Strategy,” IHS Janes, Jane’s World Insurgency and 
Terrorism, no. 1 (February 1, 2006), 1. 
23 Operation Provide Comfort was the military operation by the United States and some of its Gulfwar 
allies, starting in April 1991, to defend Kurds fleeing their homes in northern Iraq in the aftermath of the 
Persian Gulf War and deliver humanitarian aid to them. 
 Kaya, Baran, “A Different War on Terrorism: The U.S, Turkey and the PKK,” Small Wars Journal, 
May 2, 2012, http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/documents/Different-War.pdf, accessed on August 7, 2013, 
2.  
24  Fikret Bila, Komutanlar Cephesi, 4th ed. (Istanbul: Detay Yayincilik, 2007), 153.  
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group used mining and bombing tactics that were low risk but effective. The number of 
casualties of 2003 increased to 21 from only six in 2002. The PKK continued to escalate 
the tension in 2004, and causalities reached 73 during the spring and summer of 2004. 
The number grew to 92 in 2005 and 121 in 2006.25 
Finally, in 2007 Turkey tried to find ways to launch a cross-border operation 
against the PKK camps in northern Iraq. PKK’s Dağlıca Raid gave Turkey the 
opportunity to convince the Northern Iraq Kurdish Administration and America about the 
operation, which was delayed for years because of their opposition. Turkish air raids 
started on 16 December 2007. Following the air strikes, Turkish land forces staged an 
eight-day ground assault on 21 February 2008. The Turkish General Staff (TGS) declared 
more than 600 militants were killed, and facilities were destroyed by both air strikes and 
ground operations.26  
Not only rural but also urban attacks grew in 2007. Suicide and remote control 
bombs began to explode in major cities one by one. The PKK targeted civilians. “On 4 
January 2008, six people were killed when a bomb exploded in a car parked outside a 
school in Diyarbakır. While the target appears to have been a passing bus carrying 
military personnel, all of the dead were civilians. On 27 July 2008, 17 people were killed 
when two bombs were detonated by remote control within 10 minutes of each other on a 
crowded street in a working class neighborhood of Istanbul. There were no obvious 
targets in the vicinity of the blasts, which appear to have been designed merely to kill as 
many civilians as possible.”27  
However, PKK’s two-front war backfired, and it could not withstand public 
disapproval any more. On 14 April 2009 Murat Karayılan declared that the PKK was 
ready for a ceasefire. On 6 May 2009 he stated, “The priority is a (mutual) ceasefire. 
                                                
25 Yilmaz, Sait, “Terorizm ve Terorizmle Mucadele: PKK Teror Orgutu ve KCK’da Son Durum,” 
(Ankara, June 06, 2006, 21.Yuzyil Turkiye Enstitusu), 2.  
26  “Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan (PKK),” 31.  
27 Ibid, 31. 
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Arms will be laid down later on . . . First the guns will be silenced, then dialogue will 
start.”28 
Both the PKK and Turkey continued fighting despite the fact that negotiations 
between the Turkish government and Öcalan had already started in 2007. The guns were 
not silenced, but the Turkish Interior Ministry prepared the “Kurdish Opening.”29 
Accordingly, in January 2009, Turkish Radio Television (TRT) started to broadcast 
Kurdish channel TRT 6. Prime Minister Tayyip Erdoğan announced the Kurdish Opening 
officially on 23 July 2009. In return, 34 PKK members entered Turkey as “peace group” 
on 19 October 2009. They brought PKK demands and provided solutions to the ongoing 
fight. They were tried in the courts established in Şırnak/Cizre, and all were released 
without any punishment. Starting from April 2009, the Turkish Foreign Ministry and 
MIT began to play a role in the opening procedure. MIT agents negotiated with Öcalan 
and other cadre leaders inside while the Foreign Ministry was establishing peace talks in 
Oslo with PKK’s outside connections.30 
Undersecretary of MIT, Hakan Fidan, went to Imrali Prison to meet with 
Abdullah Öcalan. A total of 346 negotiation talks took place between March 2010 and 
November 2011. Those talks remain private, even though some of the documents have 
been shared with the media. However, it is clear that both sides promised to give up some 
of their previous demands or pledged to forgo some privileges.  
The peace talks showed their effect, and in 2013 summer started silently. Some 
groups began to flee to northern Iraq and the Peace and Democracy Party (BDP)31 
member Hasip Kaplan noted that more than 60% of the PKK members left Turkey.32 
                                                
28 Ibid, 4.  
29 Kurdish Opening refers to the Turkish Government’s initiative. It is about starting negotiations with 
the Kurdish groups and giving new rights to Kurdish population, besides discussing “Kurdish Problem” 
openly.     
30 Yilmaz, Sait, “PKK Teror Orgutu ve KCK’da Son Durum,” 4.    
31 The BDP is the political extension of the PKK terrorist organization that has 10% of chairs in the 
Grand National Assembly of Turkey after 2008 elections.  
32  “Kaplan: PKK’lilarin Yüzde 60’i Çikti! - Milliyet Haber.”http://gundem.milliyet.com.tr/kaplan-
pkk-lilarin-yuzde-60-i/gundem/detay/1729449/default.htm (accessed June 28, 2013). 
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Founded in 1974 as a Marxist-Leninist Organization, the PKK claimed more than 
30,000 lives in thirty years. Besides being a terrorist organization, it is involved in 
criminal activities not only in Turkey but also in many European countries as a way to 
fund its fight. The PKK’s armed struggle began in earnest in 1984, and violence reached 
its peak in early 1990s. On the other hand, Öcalan’s capture in 1999 brought a new 
dimension to the movement, and terrorist activities decreased substantially until 2003. 
Not being as severe a threat as it was in the 1990s, the PKK started serious conflicts once 
more after it started to act freely in northern Iraq when the second Iraq war destroyed the 
Saddam regime. Despite continued fighting, Ankara prepared for negotiations with the 
organization in 2007, but these negotiations were not announced until 2009. Today, peace 
talks still continue between Turkey and the PKK, and PKK members have been fleeing 
Turkey in groups.  
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II. FOUNDATION ERA 1960–1984 
For more than three decades, the PKK has been at the Turkish fore. Mostly after 
1984, the PKK caused thousands of civilian and security forces causalities and cost the 
Republic of Turkey billions of dollars. “[PKK’s] tactics… included attacks against both 
security forces and civilians—including Kurds—many of whom were viewed as 
collateral damage in the PKK’s fight, or dismissed as being complicit with the Turkish 
government.”33 In order to put an end to this bloody low-intensity conflict, first we have 
to understand what the PKK is. Without comprehending its roots, one cannot completely 
understand the organization and its life cycle. Among many others, there are three main 
instruments through which PKK has found the means to start and develop its terrorist 
activities: Turkey’s political atmosphere during the 1970s and 1980s; Abdullah Öcalan, 
the leader of the PKK; and foreign ambitions related to Turkey. 
 THE KURDISH REVOLTS AFTER THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE A.
TURKISH REPUBLIC UNTIL 1980S 
The Kurdish uprisings were not a new phenomenon for the newly established 
Turkish government. The Ottoman Empire had struggled with Ağas (land lords), aşirets 
(wealthy families in the Eastern part of the Anatolia), and şeyhs (the religious leaders) 
who sought tax, recruitment, and autonomy privileges through the end of the Empire. 
While Turks and Kurds fought together side-by-side during the War of Independence, at 
the very beginning of the republic, Turkey faced some other Kurdish militants 
cooperating with the enemy against her.  
On the October 30, 1918, the Ottoman Empire signed the Treaty of Montrose. At 
the time, some Kurdish elites tried to take advantage of the Empire’s vulnerable position 
and established Kürt Teali and Terakki Cemiyeti-KTTC (The Kurdish Elevation and 
Development Society). KTTC’s objective was to pursue the Kurd’s interests and support 
the ‘Kurdish nationalism’ thesis. Trying to divide and terminate the Ottoman Empire, the 
Soviet and British governments became the basic supporters and hope of the KTTC. With 
                                                
33  “Appendix: Kurds and the PKK,” Turkey Country Review (July 2013), 109–121.  
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Şeyh Sait as its leader, the KTTC demanded a free Kurdistan in the east-southeast of 
Anatolia; Mesopotamia; and southwestern Iran from the English Supreme Commissariat 
in Istanbul. With the help of the English Prime Minister Lloyd George, Serif Pasha 
expressed the same arguments in the Paris Peace Conference.34 
In addition to the KTTC, Kürt Milliyet Fırkasi (the Kurdish Nation Party), Kürt 
Teali Fırkasi (the Kurdish Ascension Party), Kürt Teşkılatı İçtimaiye Cemiyeti (the 
Kurdish Social Organization Society), Kürt Tamim-i Maarif ve Neşriyat Cemiyeti (the 
Kurdish Culture Circular and Press Society), İstanbul Kürt Kadınlar Cemiyeti (the 
Kurdish Women of Istanbul Society), Kürt Milli Firkasi (the Kurdish National Party), 
Kürt Hoybun Cemiyeti (the Kurdish Hoybun Society) and the Hewi Kürt Talebe 
Cemiyeti (the Hewi Kurdish Student Society) were waging a propaganda campaign for a 
Kurdish homeland-political entity in the Ottoman Empire. Without adequate support 
from the Kurdish population in southern Anatolia, Kurdish separatists could not survive 
for long in Istanbul, and some of these groups joined the Hoybun Society, which was 
active in Syria. Hoybun supported the Armenian Dashnaktsutyun (The Armenian 
Revolutionary Federation-ARF), which was fighting against the Ottoman Empire, as 
well.35 
Due to the Montrose Treaty, in addition to revolutionary groups, uprisings 
occurred in some parts of the empire to announce their freedom or to maintain support 
from powerful countries for their sovereignty. Some of the main revolts at the time were 
the Cemil Ceto Incident (May 20, 1920), the Milli Aşireti Revolt (1920) and the Kocgiri 
Uprising (1921). While they occurred in different parts of Anatolia and were led by 
diverse groups, the uprisings were all Kurdish-oriented, and their main goal was to please 
allies, especially the British, and establish their own free Kurdish State by weakening the 
central government. Besides the Kurdish uprisings, there were other insurgencies some of 
which supported the idea of the British and American mandates and some others were 
backed the caliphate rather than Atatürk’s new government. All of the revolts were 
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suppressed by the Turkish government but caused setbacks in the National Struggle in 
different ways.36  
Certainly, the Şeyh Sait Revolt is the most well-known and the most significant 
Kurdish uprising during the first years of the Turkish Republic. Şeyh Sait was a Şeyh of a 
Naqshbandi Tariqa and provoked the Kurdish citizens with the slogan, “The religion was 
being lost.”37 After Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi-TBMM (Turkish Grand National 
Assembly) amended the removal of the caliphate, Sait announced that new government 
was irreligious and every Muslim had to fight to put an end to the TBMM administration. 
On February 2, 1925 the Şeyh Sait Revolt began in Piran where his followers killed one 
of the gendarmerie soldiers who were trying to capture two of Sait’s men. The incident 
continued for two months and spread to Genç-Cakapur-Muş-Diyarbakır-Tunceli-Elazığ-
Ergani-Şanlıurfa and finally Bitlis. On 23 February the government declared martial law 
in the region, and then Prime Minister İsmet İnönü sent security forces to fight against 
rioters. With the help of the Takrir-i Sukun Law (the Peace Resolution) and İstiklal 
Mahkemeleri (the Courts of Liberty) the revolt was suppressed easily in a short time, and 
the criminals were punished.38 
There were other revolts originating from the Kurdish movement: Agri Revolts 
(including the Ağrı Revolt of 16 May to 17 June 1926, the Ağrı Revolt of 12  September 
to30 September 1927 and the Ağrı Revolt of 7 September to 14 September 1930) and the 
Dersim Uprisings. Besides these, some small-scale revolts occurred in the Eastern and 
Southeastern parts of the Turkey.39 After security forces had suppressed the revolts, 
Mustafa Kemal Atatürk commented on the political environment in Turkey saying: 
“I believe that the overriding aim of domestic policy should be to establish 
order, security and discipline in the country. My latest enquiries have 
shown that… the level of order and security in the country is very high. 
Except for a couple of political bands—which have appeared and have 
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been struck down recently—there have been no incidents. Even ordinary 
crime is decreasing.”40  
In the Ottoman Empire revolts were common but could be suppressed by the 
powerful Pashas and armies. However, in the early stages of the republic, the Turkish 
government was at war, and its sources were very limited. The Menemen, Dersim, Agri 
and Şeyh Sait uprisings not only forced the Turkish government to dedicate its precious 
sources to suppress the insurgencies, but also they opened new fronts while Turkey was 
fighting with big powers. In the end, security forces succeeded in establishing stability 
and peace in the region, and no significant activity occurred again until the 1960s.  
With the military coup of 1960, citizen and administration relations changed, and 
multi-party democracy left the arena to military rule. Turkey was faced with grand scale 
polarization among Turks as well as Kurds. Socialism became a popular trend both 
globally and domestically. Turkish and Kurdish socialists divided and created their own 
flanks. Furthermore, the Kurdish socialist community shared two different arguments 
about finding a solution to acquire Kurdish rights. While some claimed that negotiation 
with the government was impossible and the only way was armed struggle, more 
conservative Kurds thought that Kurds should occupy more seats in the parliament. From 
these two different views the first one was more popular. Consequently, the PKK became 
popular among radical Kurds and initiated armed struggle against security forces and 
Kurds who selected democratic ways.  
 THE KURDISH ACTIVITIES AFTER 1960S B.
Because of the coalition government’s inability to cooperate against uprisings and 
succeeding coups’ devastating effects on democracy, Turkey was driven into chaos 
between 1960 and the 1980s. The 1961 Constitution was brought about by the 1961 
Coup. The new Constitution was the most liberal one that Turkey had ever experienced. 
It gave political groups the opportunity to represent rival ideas that were once forbidden 
to mention. With the help of these new freedoms, organizations awakened the ethnic 
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pride among marginal groups and aroused the sentiment of Kurds, Alevis and similar 
societies. Until 1971 radical groups managed to recruit new members and polarized 
society which started the struggle between the left and right wings. Although the 1971 
Coup suppressed illegal groups, they continued their activities underground. Among the 
coups, the coup that occurred on September 12, 1980 was the most beneficial to the 
PKK’s development. It eliminated the rivals of the PKK and let the Party become the 
most brutal terrorist organization in Turkey’s history. 
1. The 1960s 
Student activities spread throughout all of Europe during the 1960s. 
Consequently, university demonstrations began in Turkey, as well. The motives of 
Turkish students were different, though. While Western students believed that they had to 
fight against the materialism of post-war reconstruction, Turkish youth complained of the 
under-development of Turkey. Actually, the Turkish economy improved rapidly under 
the Democrat Party administration in 1950s. On the other hand, rapid development 
caused inflation, and high inflation erased material gains. In fact, the government tried to 
control inflation with foreign help; conversely, Turkish students found the solution in 
Marxist ideology. For the first time in Turkey, groups could propagate Marxism under 
the auspices of the liberal constitution of 1961.  
Students believed that only the Marxist way of economic development was 
possible, and foreign aid, especially American aid, made Turkey more dependent on 
imperialism. Abdullah Öcalan also adhered to Marxism and adapted the ideology for his 
comrades. “The ‘Marxism’ of the [Apocus] movement [had] been adopted from the wave 
of the Marxist Left in the 1960s and 1970s.”41“By [the] late 1960s opposition movements 
increased in size and influence, coinciding with a wave of student movements in the 
West, as well as moderate socialist trade unions and student and youth organizations, 
professional associations of teachers, medical doctors, engineers, public officers and even 
police officers throughout Turkey, all of which expressed disenchantment with the 
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system. Soon, the Workers’ Party of Turkey (TIP) began to suffer from internal conflicts 
which started to split into factions after 1969.”42 
The main defender of the leftist ideology was The Turkish Workers’ Party (TIP), 
but it received less than 3% of the votes in 1965 and 1969 elections. After the electoral 
failure students became more radicalized and tried to express their motivations by using 
armed struggle rather than democratic ways.43     
After the long lasting silence between 1937 and 1960 in northeastern Anatolia, the 
metropolitan areas became safe havens for the student groups in 1960s and 1970s. Doğu 
Devrimci Kültür Ocakları (DDKO, The East Revolutionary Culture Societies) was the 
leading association that used Kurdish motives in 1970s. The DDKO was established in 
1969 in Ankara and opened offices in Istanbul, Ergani, Silvan, Kozluk, Diyarbakır and 
Batman. Because of the DDKO’s Marxist-Leninist ideology, Turkish leftists, especially 
the Türkiye İşçi Partisi (TIP, The Turkish Workers’ Party) supported its foundation and 
development. The DDKO publicized the Kurdish Problem as, “There is a Kurdish 
population in Turkey’s East. Holding the governance, the fascist authority has put 
Kurdish society to an assimilation and suppression policy and many times this has turned 
to a bloody dominance.”44  Abdullah Öcalan participating in the DDKO’s activities in 
late 1970s owned the same idea, “assimilation,” and used it as the PKK’s main point of 
discourse in the following years.45 
2. 1970s 
“The troubled 1970s are remembered as a period of violent ideological 
confrontation between self-styled revolutionaries and self-styled nationalists.”46 The 
pause after the coup was short lived; trouble started in university campuses. The scene 
was bloody: “231 political murders in 1977, 832 in 1978, 898 during the nine months 
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between December 1978 and September 1979, and 2812 during the following twelve 
months which led up to the assumption of power by the armed forces on September 12, 
1980. The majority of those killed were students and other young militants. But the 
victims included also prominent public figures, like Nihat Erim, prime minister of the 
first national government formed at the behest of the military in 1971, who was killed in 
July 1980 and Turkey’s best-known liberal editor, Abdi İpekci assassinated in February 
1979.”47 
Ecevit declared martial law in twenty provinces, including Istanbul, but even 
armed forces could not establish security and peace. Martial law commander General 
Selahattin Demircioğlu warned the new Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel asserting: 
Incidents of anarchy are beginning to involve the masses. After 1974, they 
turned into conflict pitting Sunnis against Alevis, and then Kurds against 
Turks. 
Due to the rapid growth of legal and illegal pro-Marxist organizations, the 
army believed that civilians were once again meddling dangerously with 
the ‘democratization opportunities’ [of the 1961 Constitution] they had 
been presented with. On 12 March 1971, the Chief of Staff of the Turkish 
Armed Forces overthrew the [Süleyman] Demirel government, which was 
considered to be a successor to [Adnan] Menderes’ mainstream 
government. A state of emergency was imposed, associations of all sorts 
were dissolved, the TIP was banned, the right to strike was suspended, 
ongoing strikes were ended and widespread arrests of politicians and 
‘extreme’ activists took place.48  
After the 1971 Turkish coup d’état, DDKO lost its power, members were caught 
and sent to prison; the ones who could escape fled to Syria, Iraq and Iran, and then 
continued their activities in these countries. The group tried to reunite after military 
power left the government and elections were held in 1974; however, they could not 
manage to achieve the same success that they had before the coup.49   
After the 12 March Memorandum, prisoners and deserters worked intensively to 
reorganize and develop the Kurdish and separatist motivated groups. When Demokratik 
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Sol Parti (DSP, Democratic Leftist Party) took power in 1974, the Prime Minister Bülent 
Ecevit convinced the TBMM to enact a general amnesty for the militants who were 
arrested during the 12 March Coup. The Prime Minister was willing to risk a lot to 
remain in power. Ecevit, well aware of the public discontent about the arrests, wanted to 
establish a more peaceful ground for both the leftists and rightists, but its result was not 
what he expected it to be. General Amnesty became a unique opportunity for militants to 
gain ground in Turkey. Many runaway leaders returned to Turkey or were set free from 
prison, then in a very short time organized and established numerous new illegal groups 
both in big cities and in rural areas.   
Öcalan used the 1974‒1978 period to develop his knowledge about the theories of 
revolutionary activity and establishing a party. At the end, PKK was formally established 
in 1978, but members kept their organization secret. The main objective of the party was 
to establish a Kurdish state after carrying out a successful communist revolution. On the 
other hand, the PKK did not have the capacity to implement such a revolution because of 
insufficient arms and members. Thus, to finance its activities, it started to rob jewelers’ 
stores and became involved in drug trafficking.50  
Some organizations like RIZGARI, ALA RIZGARI, KOIP and, TKSP (PSK) 
preferred to work legally and continue to espouse their propaganda; still others like 
KAWA, KUK and PKK continued to be illegal organizations and prepared for the armed 
struggle.51 While following different paths between 1974 and 1980, most of these 
organizations embraced Marxist-Leninist ideology and Kurdish nationalism. The world’s 
communist political atmosphere, the Vietnam War, and the Palestine Liberation 
Organization (PLO) intifada affected and gave hope to the Kurdish separatist groups 
operating in Turkey. “When violence finally broke out, it drew its inspiration from the 
radicalism which had affected students in wealthier and, therefore, different societies.”52 
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3. 1980s 
Weak coalition governments, which followed each other in quick succession, 
were unable to establish order either in the streets or in the economy. Almost all of the 
public services except for the universities became politicized and split into rival factions. 
Neither Süleyman Demirel nor Bülent Ecevit, the leaders of the two largest political 
parties of Turkey, could present a common front; the state seemed paralyzed. “During the 
escalation of urban and rural terrorism in Turkey from January 1979 to September 1980 
in the period prior to the coup, a total of 3546 civilians and 164 security forces had been 
murdered. In the same period a total of 146 ‘terrorists’ had been killed while the number 
of wounded from both sides had reached 10417.”53 The Parliament was even unable to 
elect a president of the republic; this would lead to the chaos that brought the 12 
September 1980 Coup.54   
The chaotic environment of the late 1970s opened the door to illegal organizations 
to grow and strengthen their flanks. However, there was little harmony between the 
groups that supported an independent Kurdish state. Consequently, the PKK did not 
comprise a long lasting relationship with any other leftist or Kurdish separatist groups. 
Surprisingly, the PKK declared rival groups as “reformists, small bourgeois nationalists, 
and agent-provocateurs that cooperated with the government.”55 
Besides political failures and economic crisis, rough terrain and the old-fashioned 
system in Southeastern Anatolia caused difficulties to the government’s establishing 
control. The Aşiret composition in the eastern part of Turkey, a mountainous and rugged 
territory, the conservative population guided by Şeyhs rendered the region vulnerable to 
political, social and economic provocations. Because of the land surface and the feudal 
composition, Turkish security forces could not maintain full control over the area and 
were thus unable to respond to initial illegal activities completely.56 
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“Since a series of coalition governments failed to curb terrorism and to apply 
economic austerity measures, which were hampered by strikes and lockouts, the military 
leadership decided to take over. On the eve of the September 12, 1980, military coup, 
PKK leaders left Turkey for the Syrian-controlled Bekaa valley. They might either have 
foreseen that a coup was in the making or might have been in search of a safe haven 
abroad, for their activities were very limited because of an existing martial law in the 
eastern and southeastern provinces.”57  
The outcome of the coup was catastrophic for the illegal organizations. “During 
the four years which followed the military take-over, nearly 180000 persons were 
detained, some 65000 were charged, 42000 sentenced and 25 executed.”58    
In 1980, all of the legal and illegal Kurdish developments, including the PKK, lost 
their power because of the strict measures resulting from the September 12 Coup. Some 
groups tried to cooperate with others and establish new organizations, but none of them 
became successful and eventually expired The PKK, wounded but not dead, continued its 
activities outside of the border, despite its very limited number of members when 
compared to the numbers before the coup. “By stopping the slide to civil war, the military 
had opened the door to progress in the economy and also in democratic governance. But 
although the violent conflict between left-wing and right-wing terrorists had been 
arrested, other terms of terror continued.”59 The PKK came into Turkey where its old 
powerful rivals no longer existed. “This apparently came as a shock to many security 
officials, not because they really shared the official argument that most of the pre-1980 
organizations had been fully crushed, but they believed that it would take years for the 
terrorists to re-establish themselves.”60 
Between 1980 and 1984, Öcalan strengthened the party structure and appointed 
himself as the undisputed leader of the organization. It can be concluded that the PKK 
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problem developed in 1980s because of certain internal shortcomings, and external 
factors have also played a crucial role in the problem’s persistence. 
4. PKK OUTBREAK  
The PKK was founded as Ankara Demokrat Yurtsever Yüksek Öğretim Birliği in 
1974 and was named Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan, PKK, in the 1978 Diyarbakır‒Lice 
meeting. In order to understand the PKK’s foundation, one should value the political 
atmosphere of Turkey and the world at that time. In addition the PKK leader Abdullah 
Öcalan should be examined from the very early stages of his life up to the time he 
became the head of the organization. 
Turkey’s 1960s should be observed in order to understand the social environment 
and the 1960 Coup during which the PKK took its first steps. After a long silence 
Kurdish activities resumed in 1960; the previoust revolt had been the 1937 Dersim 
incident. Adnan Menderes’ government ruled Turkey in 1950s and 1960s and maintained 
more relaxed policies toward the Kurds. Nationalist streams from both Turkish and 
Kurdish sides flowed more powerfully during these years; thus, the emergence and 
development of the PKK was an output of the reactionary collision of emerging Turkish 
and Kurdish nationalism. Because of the rising opposition and separationist declarations 
armed forces began to worry about the unity of Turkey. On May 27, 1960 the Turkish 
army took the control.61   
Subsequent to the 1960 Coup, chaos ended and the military administration 
restored civilian law with the 1961 Constitution. Likewise, the DP commenced a 
liberation effort in 1961 in eastern Anatolia, but once again Kurdish national awareness 
triggered military action, and the army adapted policies similar to the old rigid ones and 
arrested some Kurdish activists, including 54 Kurdish DP members. Such developments 
caused ethnic self-awareness among Kurdish youth, but this time they could act more 
freely under the liberal nature of the 1961 Constitution.62  
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The PKK began to emerge in the 1970s when student movements were growing 
all around the world. Youth was politicized and appreciated the ideology of bringing 
down the existing governments and establishing the new ones according to their beliefs. 
Besides the external influences, illegal organizations took advantage of the 1961 
Constitution to exert opposing views.  “Among the new rights were public freedom of 
expression, press freedom, the right to organize meetings and demonstration, and the 
right to form trade unions and associations (Turkish Constitution of 1961, articles 20, 23, 
24, 25, 28).”63   
The return to democracy in 1961, with a liberal constitution and the 
growth of a multiparty system, allowed the development and emergence of 
Kurdish and Turkish alongside one another. The decades of the 1960s and 
1970s witnessed growing differences between the traditionalist, 
conservative, business communities of the Kurds and the socialist 
activists. Kurdish socialism initially grew as part of the broader Turkish 
socialist movements. However, during the 1970s, a split developed 
between Turkish socialism and Kurdish socialism which lead to the 
formation of the Partia Karkare Kurdistan, or the Workers’ Party of 
Kurdistan (PKK). This development was mainly a result of the Turkish 
left’s rejection of the nationalistic tendencies of Kurdish socialists. The 
PKK made its first appearance in 1974 and later in the same decade turned 
against the traditional authority of the religious and tribal leaders and 
towards the Turkish revolutionary groups, adopting the practices of 
violence and terror.64 
In addition to the recently gained freedoms, which were used for ill purposes, 
seventeen governments took place after the coup until 1980 and created uncertainty. An 
authority gap ended political stability and created a suitable environment for anarchy. 
Turkey witnessed the emergence of many other revolutionary organizations like the PKK 
that were affected by leftist ideology. The PKK survived by effectively reacting to the 
variations in its field of activity and international environment. The PKK could learn 
from its mistakes and by using these experiences, it made accurate decisions to gain or 
sustain its power.  
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In such a politicized environment Abdullah Öcalan was in search of an identity. 
He first met with militants in Mamak Military Prison. Mahir Cayan, leader of Marxist 
group Türkiye Halk Kurtuluş Partisi/Cephesi-THKP/C (The Turkish Peoples’ Salvation 
Party/Front) and some other members had an armed struggle with security forces, and a 
few died on March 30, 1972. The day after, some students of the Faculty of Political 
Sciences protested the event; Öcalan was one of arrestees and accused of “shouting 
slogans” and “distributing leaflets.” He stayed in Mamak prison for nearly seven months 
and was released in October 1972.65 
Öcalan explained how imprisonment affected him in these passages: 
“I was in Mamak… After the operations, as leftist organizations were erased and 
as the members liquidated, they were sent to us [Mamak]. You know, TIP, THKP-C, in 
short all of them were sent. Here, I saw the first defeat from them, what I understood: the 
conclusion that it was inevitable to pursue a more radical inclination and continuously be 
organized… This is how I perceived that I should establish an organization.   
If the ‘Defeat of 71’ had not occurred in the form of Kızıldere [the reason for his 
imprisonment], I would have remained a good sympathizer or member of the DHKP-C at 
the very most; I could not have ventured on structuring a new theory … The emergence 
of myself would have been impossible if Kızıldere had not happened.”66 
In sum, political atmosphere of Turkey let illegal organization’s emergence and 
development. During this period, Öcalan was able to shape his mind and prepared for 
creating his own cadre in order to put his bloody war into action against the Turkish 
government. Despite its appropriateness for illegal organizations elaboration, Turkey’s 
political turmoil is not enough to understand PKK’s surfacing. Öcalan was the driving 
force that directed the organization, determined the strategy, imposed political 
motivations to the members and revealed the PKK that what people know as the PKK.   
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III. ABDULLAH ÖCALAN 
 ÖCALAN’S BACKGROUND A.
Abdullah Öcalan’s role in PKK’s existence is incontrovertible. His dictatorship 
when combined with his leader cadre’s merciless punishment methods turned the PKK 
members into bloodthirsty killing machines that obeyed his commands without any 
criticism. What came out of Öcalan’s mouth became Party rule, and members carried out 
orders without questioning. Thus, one cannot fully understand the PKK’s emergence 
without understanding Öcalan’s personality and ideology. 
“Rapid social change after World War II did not put an end to the tradition of 
violence. True, tribal organizations weakened as nomads were settled and towns grew in 
size, but kinship, loyalty, rooted in the old tribes survived. The growing integration of the 
southeast with the rest of the country produced new tensions, as the whole of Turkey 
experienced the pains of growth. The spread of education increased expectations, and 
spurred the search for shortcuts when these expectations were not met. These conditions 
favored the emergence of violent men with simple ideas. The most ruthless among them 
was Abdullah Öcalan, known as Apo. His followers were called Apocu (Apo-ites) and 
his movement Apoculuk (Apo-ism), terms which became synonymous with the PKK, the 
terrorist organization he dominated until his capture in 1999.”67 
“Öcalan was born in Şanlıurfa’s Halfeti district’s Omerli village in 1947 in a poor 
and querulous family. He had a weak and ill father but a dominant nervous mother. His 
mother was managing the house and leading the family, which was very unusual in a 
patriarchal society. His mother was behaving ruthlessly to both her husband and children. 
His mother in many circumstances exposed Öcalan to violence. During an interview, he 
talked about being beaten nearly to death by his mother when he had a quarrel with his 
friends and returned home crying. His mother did not accept his returning home without 
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taking revenge. This all led to continuous thoughts of ferocity, wrote Öcalan, “the 
importance of revenge and the use of violence.”68 
He admitted his psychology in this passage: 
In the fight among the children in my village my head was cracked. When 
I returned home, I cried sobbingly as ‘they beat me.’ Of course, by crying 
I hoped that my mother would protect and defend me. But when my 
mother came back home, instead of protecting and defending me she said, 
‘Either you will go and take your revenge or I won’t let you in’ she threw 
me out of the house. And my mother was very insistent in this principle. 
Even though it was difficult, I started my first activities under her 
insistence. I began to be an attacker; I cracked the heads of many 
children… what I mean is she made me under that pressure. She threw me 
in the fight by saying, ‘Even if you are dead, you will again go and take 
your revenge… Everyday!’ I was quarrelsome… I am a product of an 
extremely conflicted environment. Everyday I fight against neighbors, 
against father and against myself.69 
In his memories Öcalan confesses that he wished his father was dead when he 
understood his father’s weakness. “Not even his relatives took him seriously, and he was 
hurt by them. It was if as he did not exist; he was gone.”  Another figure who affected 
him was his older sister, Havva, and her arranged marriage to an old man. He notes this 
incident as his decision to protect women’s rights began soon after this marriage.70 
Öcalan went to primary school in a nearby village and attended to elementary 
school in Nizip where he stayed in the home of one of his relatives. He emphasizes that 
his Kurdish identity started to develop in his elementary school years. “I still remember, 
some were officers’ children and some were the children of ağa-eşraf [village owners, 
wealthy persons]. I had some like Kurdish property. I think my doings were not too 
powerful or according to them there were discrepancies in my certain behaviors.   I 
cannot be like them. It is clear that I would not fit in according to their social 
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characteristics and they saw this as a risk. By prickling, mocking, like this every day, 
they have the oppotunity to denigrate me in comparison to themselves.”71 
Öcalan went to Ankara in 1966 to rid himself of poverty and became a successful 
man in order to be respected. One can see a pattern in his successes and failures while he 
was studying in the Land Registry and Cadaster Vocational High School. He was trying 
to find an outlet for his confusion and frustration. He was going to Maltepe Mosque or 
attending meetings of the Fighting Against Communism Association; on the other hand, 
he was reading Barzani interviews in the Akşam Newspaper. Öcalan proudly describes 
his devotion to Islam by giving an example from his childhood. The imam of his village 
praised his doing well at Quran studies as “Abdullah, if you keep your pace like this, you 
will fly [be a saint].”72  
He met with communism when he read the primer “Socialism’s Alphabet” (The 
ABCs of Communism) in his high school years. While reading, he was repeating, 
“religion was losing and Marx was winning,” thus his ideas were shifting from religion to 
socialism.73 
Kurdish movements in Turkey gained momentum in 1960s after the Democrat 
Party took over the government. Groups, under Barzani’s influence, organized and 
prepared for their future battle. The Cold War was on the scene, and Turkey was 
America’s ally. Thus, in order to weaken the Turkish government and gain an ally on 
Turkish soil, Kurdish groups became a critical matter for Moscow once more.  
After graduating from high school in 1968, Öcalan was assigned to Diyarbakır as 
a cadastral officer. He was taking bribes to save money for “the general insurgence that 
would be started one day.” He worked in Diyarbakır, and then he went to Istanbul and 
worked in Avcılar in 1970. He continued to “save money for the revolution.” At the same 
time, he was preparing for the university examination to study in the Social Sciences 
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Faculty. As he had learned communism from a book, he learned the term “nationalism” 
after reading “Question de la Politique Nationale et de L’internationalisme Proletarian.”74 
In 1968 and 1969, meetings called Doğu Mitingleri (The East Meetings) were 
organized in major Kurdish cities where Kurds voiced their demands. The East Meetings 
inspired the establishment of the DDKO in 1969. DDKO’s standpoint was mainly 
socialist on the Kurd’s demands and problems. The DDKO stayed active until the 1971 
Coup. Öcalan took part in DDKO activities from which the Marxist and Kurdish 
nationalist approach influenced him. Öcalan went one step further and “bravely” 
questioned the idea “why there should not be a Kurdish country” that no one ever dared 
to think about in the 1970s’ Turkey. Another influence on Öcalan’s mindset was Mahir 
Cayan who was the leader of THKP-C.75 Mahir Cayan was one of the most influential 
figures who radicalized Turkish youth in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Cayan first 
became a Marxist, then the advocate of Kurdish identity. He provoked the Kurdish 
community in eastern Turkey to revolt, and Turkish army commandos killed him in 1972 
during an armed struggle.76 
Öcalan was successful in the university examinations and attended Istanbul 
University Law School first but then voluntarily transferred to the Ankara University 
Faculty of Political Sciences. He preferred studying in Ankara because he knew the city 
better, and he had like-minded friends studying in Ankara who thought there should be a 
Kurdish revolution. At university he became the leader of the student organization “SBF” 
as a “third grade militant.” He was arrested on June 7, 1972, because of illegal leaflet 
distribution, but he continued to study in the faculty after he was released.77“After being 
released, he started to talk to other students from the southeast region, mainly Kurdish 
members of AYOD [Ankara Higher Education Association], and in short time was 
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prepared to hold the first meeting that would gradually lead to the establishment of the 
UKO (Ulusal Kurtuluş Ordusu) or National Liberation Army which was the nucleus of 
the PKK.”78  
I had one-to-one meetings in the utmost secrecy with each individual 
person for the nucleus of the group. The idea of colonialism was emerging 
at that time. ‘The Kurdish question is a colonial matter,’ I said. Nobody 
had thought of such a diagnosis [about Kurdistan] if you remember. But 
the terms ‘Kurdistan,’ ‘colony’ came to my mind… do you believe that 
when I was going to tell someone I used to go to the deepest room, if there 
were two doors I shut them both, and I was simply whispering into their 
ears.79 
Among his friends he tried to create a profile of a man of wisdom and courage. 
He was spreading the idea that “Kurdistan is a dominion” by talking to people one by 
one, face to face. Similar to Öcalan’s idea, some Kurdish groups were mentioning their 
‘worries’ about the ‘discrimination tendencies’ against the Kurds. They incited the Kurds 
to secede by using the linguistic and educational restraints or by admitting that Turks 
treated Kurds as second-class citizens. 
 BEING THE GROUP LEADER B.
At last, Öcalan managed to convince a few students, and they became followers 
of the Kurdish movement; thus he built his own group. At the “Çubuk Dam picnic” he 
started to talk with people in groups rather than one-on-one. Another more organized 
meeting was held in Ankara Tuzluçayır. In this meeting there were the same seven people 
who had been at the Çubuk picnic. “The participants, who were to rise to fame later in the 
history of the PKK were Abdullah Öcalan, Haki Karaer, M. Hayri Durmuş, Kemal Pir, 
Mazlum Doğan, Cemil Bayık and Şahin Dönmez.”80 
“At the Tuzluçayır meeting, Öcalan created a strong position for himself, and 
from then on he began to be recognized as the obvious leader. He ‘was gradually 
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becoming a leader for their nameless gathering.’”81 Now, he was closer to achieving his 
goal and became a popular leader among the students because most of the student leaders 
were either in prison or in foreign countries. Leftist organizations were incautious and 
spread their propaganda by openly using all kinds of media. Thus, police could easily 
chase and detain them. On the other hand, Öcalan used one-on-one tactics and kept 
himself and his group unnoticed. “Although much information has been obtained on the 
organization’s activities since it was declared a party, the 1974‒78 period is still the least 
known one.”82  
Despite their amateurism, the PKK gradually expanded its activities by 
concentrating its efforts on recruiting new members and preparing the structures for an 
armed conflict. After gaining enough power, Öcalan tried to attract members of the other 
groups like ADYOD, T-KDP and KAWA, but his plan backfired, and he lost members 
rather than recruiting new ones. By this time, ideological conflicts and the struggle for 
recruits caused mutual distrust and the hostility among rival groups. The PKK leader told 
his comrades that adequate conditions for freedom existed in Turkey, and they did not 
need to get on well with other ‘Turkish leftist’ groups any more. The PKK branded 
leftists as ‘social-Chauvinists.’83  
“As a Marxist-Leninist organization it had employed generic Party techniques 
mostly for the purpose of eliminating like-minded rivals. When the PKK was officially 
founded in 1978, there were at least eight other illegal Kurdish organizations in Turkey. 
There were also a number of socialist and communist groups. Instead of cooperating with 
like-minded organizations, the PKK’s leader Öcalan dedicated much of his time and 
energies to purging his movement of those who dared to contest his authority. Öcalan 
was willing to kill his fellow leftists, as well as other Kurds whom he believed to disagree 
with the PKK’s plan for the immediate communist revolution in Kurdistan. “Brutality 
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took place even inside the ranks of the PKK itself.”84 The scene gives important clues to 
the question how the PKK was able to emerge as the most powerful organization despite 
its short history and comparatively weak organization. 
Öcalan did not found the PKK by himself, but he had the most important effect on 
the PKK’s organization. When this fact is recognized it reveals that Öcalan is actually not 
only the key to explore t the “why” of the PKK but also the “how” of the PKK. 
Consequently, one must recognize his importance in order to understand the dynamics of 
the PKK in its first years.  
 PROFESSIONALISM C.
Groups, including Öcalan’s, were mostly active in the universities; thus, the 
members recruited were students. These students created the backbone of these 
organizations. Öcalan’s group (Apocular) extended its movements into the rural areas. 
“According to official sources in Ankara, the first pioneers of this propaganda campaign 
were Kemal Pir and Cemil Bayik, who were sent to Gaziantep, Şahin Dönmez and Ali 
Haydar Kaptan, who were placed in charge of Tunceli province and Abdullah Öcalan, 
who went to his home-town of Şanlıurfa.”85 When the schools were closed and militant 
students went to their hometowns, they were spreading the group’s propaganda. Thus, 
supporters were increasing both in major cities and in rural areas.  
Because of this development Öcalan decided to step forward and increase the 
professionalism in their actions. “The Dikmen Meeting” was the first phase of the 
Apocus-organized meeting and decision making. In the Dikmen Meeting the main topic 
was the organization’s revolutionary programs. At this time the “Ideological phase” was 
ending and the party was evolving from “an optional, volunteer revolution to a 
professional revolution.”86   
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After the Dikmen meeting, Öcalan and his comrades met in Diyarbakır to prepare 
their ‘party program,’ which was published as ‘Kürdistan Devriminin Yolu’ or ‘Path of 
the Kurdish Revolution.’ In the meeting they discussed the leftist and Kurdish activities 
in Turkey and decided on the future strategy of the organization. 
The First Party Program87 is very important to understand motivation principles 
of the PKK. A summary of the 1977 Party Program draft follows: 
• Kurdistan has been divided into four regions by the four exploiting 
countries: Syria, Iraq, Iran and Turkey. 
• The largest part of this territory is Turkish Kurdistan (Middle-West and 
North of the Whole) 
• There are semi-feudal production relations in existence in this territory. 
This is a classic pattern of exploitation. 
• In the revolution there will be a national democratic revolution. 
• The structure of revolution will be a national democratic revolution. 
• The minimum objective will be to establish an independent non-aligned 
Kurdistan State in the region. 
• The maximum objective will be to establish a state based on Marxist-
Leninist principles. 
• The proletariat will be the pioneering force of the revolution. 
• The peasants will be the major force of the revolution.  
• The main alliance for the revolution will be the alliance between workers-
peasants and intellectual youth. 
• The allied forces in this revolutionary movement will include other 
patriotic circles, the Turkish revolutionary movement, other patriotic 
revolutionary movements in capitalist countries and international 
liberation movements. 
• Propaganda activities will be supported by armed violence. 
• Obstacles in front of the Kurdish revolution include: 
• Fascists (Idealist youth or Nationalist Action Party), 
• Social-Chauvinists (Those in the Turkish left who believe that the 
freedom of Kurds depended on the revolution in Turkey), 
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• The agents and state-supporter network (in Kurdish territory 
financed by Turkey) and 
• Feudal landlords and natural collaborators.  
While the program suggested ‘armed propaganda activities,’ in order not to 
endanger preparation or the organizational structure, security forces were not targeted 
deliberately. Ex-PKK militant Şahin Dönmez thought that due to the influence of the 
Ottoman structure of the society, people living in the east and southeast grew up with 
strong feelings of respect towards the state. Because of this mindset, it was difficult to 
establish a Marxist-Leninist mentality in the region; thus the need for armed propaganda 
was realized.88 
The PKK incrementally targeted the goals mentioned in its program. Furthermore, 
the party severely punished anybody who dared to criticize the decisions. Thus, Öcalan 
established strict discipline inside the PKK, and fear spread among the Kurdish people in 
the region. Because of the attacks, more powerful leftist organizations deserted the rural 
areas, and the PKK’s small groups took their places.89 Öcalan was in favor of armed 
struggle:90 
I had a principle for myself: why did I dare to initiate and believe in this 
war? Because the greatest harlot is one who does not fight. 
My world at the very beginning was this: I [mold] myself to believe this. 
All of these men [implying the leading figures] in the Kurdish groups 
which claimed to undertake the national cause are dishonest. Why? 
Because, I said, they prostitute themselves more than a prostitute. I said I 
will fight for loftier aims. In short, in those early times I oriented myself in 
believing this, and this belief, look, is my nutriment, my sap. It still drives 
me. Naturally, the belief on its own is not good enough; I also mentioned 
tactics. Tactics are indeed much more intelligent than evil. 
The group progressed gradually and steadily by increasing its membership, but 
simultaneously controlling people became more and more challenging. Öcalan visited his 
comrades’ works in Anatolia (Ağrı, Kars, Tunceli, Elazığ, Şanlıurfa, and Antep) in order 
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to emphasize his presence and observe the group’s activities. While an enlarged group 
became more difficult to control, Öcalan began to put his violent precautions into action 
in order to bar dissolution within the group. Öcalan intimidated the members, who 
became aware of the fact that any opposition to his decisions would be their death 
warrant. 
While Öcalan was trying to restore order, one of the group’s leaders, Haki Karaer, 
was killed in Gaziantep and panic started among members. Öcalan tried to soothe 
frightened members and severely punished the ones that were not “convinced” to stay 
with the group. Once again he managed to keep people inside his organization.  
 APOCULAR D.
Öcalan began to grow wilder. He could not stand any contrary ideas inside and 
outside of the group. Rival organizations and individuals were put on the spot. Even 
columnists, criticizing Apocu movement, were targeted. A journalist from Aydınlık 
newspaper was killed because of his counter-view comments about Apocu’s violence in 
his column. Öcalan assumed all rivals were enemies without assessing their number or 
power. Öcalan punished even leftist or Kurdish separatist organizations. His group 
believed in the Stalinist socialism, which terminated rival organizations. Just as the 
Russian Communist Party banned all other parties and got rid of cliques, Öcalan and his 
followers fought with the other Kurdish groups in 1970s. Öcalan wanted to be the only 
“representative” of the Kurds.91 
Apocular sought to occupy new territories that were already held by others. In 
May 1978 the terrorist Halil Cavgun was killed in Hilvan while trying to penetrate the 
city where the Süleymanlar Aşiret (tribe) was dominant. Öcalan planned an assassination 
of the leader of Süleymanlar to take revenge. By doing so, he would show his superiority 
against the wealthy landowners who were supporting the Turkish government. Two PKK 
members killed Mehmet Baysal, the leader of the Süleymancılar. This incident was a 
message sent to the Kurdish people that only Apocular and no other Kurdish group dared 
to fight against powerful families of the region. By the same token, the PKK’s popularity 
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increased among poor and hopeless villagers who never before thought that standing up 
against the landlords was possible. The Cavgun’s revenge operation was the starting 
point of the PKK’s offensive activities. The assassinations of other agha (the leaders of 
wealthy families) succeeded Mehmet Baysal, and on July 30, 1979 the group tried to kill 
Mehmet Cemil Bucak, a parliamentarian of the Justice Party and the leader of the Bucak 
Aşiret.92 The assassination attempt was important to reveal two facts. First, the PKK 
could estimate the upcoming military intervention; second, they also recognized that they 
did not have the capacity to maintain a guerilla war yet. Öcalan described their dilemma 
as: 
By the end of the 1970s, it was evident that a military regime was coming. 
Meanwhile, our resources to develop the party’s central structure and its 
armed struggle were running out. Our going abroad is closely related these 
developments. We had to go out and create the sources which would feed 
our struggle whatever happened.93 
Apo’s perception of the struggle distinguished his group from others. Some 
groups were thinking that the Kurdish problem could be solved by democratic means; 
however, some others accepted the necessity of the armed struggle but could not decide 
when to start. Öcalan was the first to initiate the armed struggle, and this was his biggest 
advantage in gaining popularity from the Kurdish hawks. He was brutal, and it was 
working.  
High-profile targets appealed to more sympathizers and increased the morale of 
the group members. Bucak’s assassination effort, even though it failed, was a clear 
declaration of the PKK’s existence, although it had been active since early 1970s. As 
mentioned before Haki Karaer’s murder caused a panic within the group. The fear forced 
Apocus to answer two questions: will the group survive or not? Or, will it upgrade itself 
or not? 
The process from 1977 to 1978 was a determining process to decide whether ‘we 
shall be a party or continue as a group’. After having a very hard time we concluded, 
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“Let’s give ourselves a party name; we are weak, we are powerless but it would at least 
be good if a party name was to go down in history.”94 
On November 28, 1978 in Diyarbakır’s Fis village they decided to shift their 
group into a party. Still, the members kept the name as a secret until July 1979, and they 
delayed the announcement for a significant event.95 
In declaring the PKK, Öcalan re-organized the group and brought a more 
professional approach to their activities. Small groups were not acting individually any 
more. “The Central Committee was authorized as the sole decision-maker within the 
overall structure, with authority to control everyone and make decisions on behalf of the 
party without a congress.”  The central committee consisted of Öcalan, Şahin Dönmez 
and Cemil Bayik.96  After they adopted the name ‘PKK’, Öcalan, as party leader, started 
the clashes that took place between PKK and the security forces, because Öcalan believed 
in guerilla warfare. 
The PKK was not professional in much of its work; some members continued 
their old habits. The Central Committee could not control eager young members who 
tried to prove themselves. The small individual groups used the most brutal methods, 
operations were not planned as required, and outcomes were getting the PKK into 
trouble. Additionally, because of their hostility, the PKK gained lots of enemies: rival 
leftist or Kurdish groups, Aşirets and opposing villagers. The PKK was bleeding and 
losing its popularity. 
 FEAR AND PANIC E.
The 1961 constitution was the most liberal and social constitution ever made in 
Turkey’s history. Thus, illegal groups began to act freely and voiced the “East Matter.”97 
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“These groups were encouraged by victorious popular examples of socialist movements 
in different territories across the world, such as Asia, Africa and Latin America.”98   
The dynamics of 1960s and 1970s introduced immense social and economic 
changes in Turkey. Migration from rural areas to big cities caused rapid urbanization. 
Nevertheless economic development could not cope with increasing unemployment. 
Small groups gathered in metropolitan areas, especially Istanbul, accordingly national 
identity became important for the immigrants. Opposition emerged in shantytowns and 
opposition-generated grievances provided fertile ground for outlawed organizations in the 
cities. The main grievance of Kurds had been the denial of cultural and political rights.99 
By ruining the gains and freedoms of the 1961 constitution, the 1971 military 
coup decreased the activities of illegal groups. On the other hand, military rule continued 
only for the next three years. In 1974 the military administration stepped down and 
transferred the government to civilian control. Instability in the government paved the 
way for outlawed organizations, and chaos dominated life once more. From 1974 to 1980 
four coalition governments took place in Parliament. The violence that began to speed up 
reached its peak in 1979; tens of people were dying every day. “The intensity of terrorist 
violence in Turkey was striking: [between 1978‒1980] 43,000 incidents of political 
violence occurred in the country, each resulting in fatalities averaging twenty eight deaths 
per day.” Security forces lost control both in universities and in villages. In order to end 
the perilous and terrifying course of the country, the military was planning another 
coup.100 
For the sake of its reputation and superiority, the PKK’s local leaders were 
working in their territories and showing a presence in the villages. In May 1979, police 
arrested Şahin Dönmez, one of the top leaders of the PKK, in Elazığ. The PKK was faced 
with panic once more because the police gained a lot of information about the 
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organization from Dönmez’s confession. Dönmez was the first leader detained by the 
police, and he told everything he knew. Assuming that Dönmez mentioned where he was 
stationed, Öcalan left his safe house in Diyarbakır. Öcalan moved from one city to 
another, but nowhere was safe anymore. He had to get over this trouble, so he left Turkey 
and fled to Syria in July without notifying other members. It took one year for others to 
realize his escape, and they also abandoned Turkey in groups.101 This flight saved the 
group because the 1980 Military Coup would sweep up the PKK members who stayed in 
Turkey. Even though Dönmez told the police everything he knew about the PKK and 
there were twenty four of them in it, the PKK’s name was not mentioned in the official 
list of left-wing terrorist groups that was published on August 30, 1980.102 Öcalan notices 
the importance of Dönmez’s capture as: 
The Elazığ arrest was a slight arrest that could not be counted as my 
imprisonment’s cause. But Şahin [said]  ‘Let’s go and find him [Öcalan] 
very easily. In fact, one of the most important aspects [of Elazığ’s arrest] 
was its forcing us to decide… By capturing and telling everything he 
drove me to take the decision of going abroad.103  
Leftist and rightist movements were terrorizing Turkey; people got used to 
hearing about tens of victims killed from both sides every day, and the police could not 
maintain order in the streets. Too much turnover in Parliament hindered the government 
from taking the necessary actions. On September 12, 1980, General Chief of Staff Kenan 
Evren addressed the public and announced the military coup on the radio. Killings, 
fighting, smuggling, and similar violence suddenly ended. After order was restored, the 
members of illegal organizations were arrested and put into prison; the lucky ones 
managed to escape to foreign countries where their comrades were waiting. The military 
administration charged a group of scholars and military personnel with rewriting the 
constitution. The 1960 Constitution was found too liberal and was pruned in 1971, and 
the 1980 Constitution was prepared in order to prevent the reemergence of the illegal 
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groups.104 However, due to international complaints another constitution was ratified in 
1982.105    
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IV. FOREIGN SUPPORT 
It was unimaginable that the PKK would survive the devastating effects of the 
coups or develop and return to Turkey as a stronger organization without foreign aid. The 
PKK learned how to organize and undertake guerilla warfare in Palestinian (Democratic 
Front for the Liberation of Palestine ) camp and train its members in Lebanon Beqaa 
Valley and in Northern Iraq.  
European countries also supplied recruitment and financial support to the PKK. 
Russia, Greece, Bulgaria and many other countries offered weapons, money and 
encouragement to the organization to fight against the Turkish government..  
 NEIGHBOR COMRADES  A.
Whenever the group found itself in trouble inside Turkey, foreign counties 
rescued the PKK. Syria and Iraq, for example, played a substantial role in PKK’s 
development by supporting the group in every way. While the September 12 Coup 
destroyed illegal organizations, the PKK found new havens and friends outside of 
Turkey. Being in Palestine not only helped the PKK to survive but also helped it to 
reorganize and train its members for upcoming rural campaigns. 
“The roots of the groups which fought each other and the state in 1970s lay within 
Turkey. But these roots produced a poisonous growth in such abundance because they 
were watered from abroad.”106 The PKK enjoyed the active support of some of Turkey’s 
neighbors. “Relations with friendly forces in Iran, Iraq, Lebanon and Europe were also 
established through Öcalan and his comrades, which created the necessary conditions for 
the survival of PKK militants abroad.”107 After most members fled to Syria they passed 
to Lebanon. Öcalan was busy making preparations for the newcomers. He preferred 
Lebanon because he had connections with Lebanese leaders and was not known by the 
Syrian authorities. Lebanon was a suitable place to grow because the civil war there made 
it difficult for the government to maintain adequate control over the country. Öcalan met 
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the leader of the DELP, Nayif Hawatmah, and Palestinian political leadership member, 
Abu Laila, in Damascus. He managed to convince them, and DELP offered to host and 
train PKK militants. In the Palestinian Halwe camp PKK terrorists were learning: 
military training, explosives, topography, artillery and guerilla fighting. Besides military 
training, Palestinians were spreading propaganda and motivating civil insurgency 
education in the camp. Between 1980 and 1982, more than 300 PKK terrorists were 
trained in the camps of DELP, including Yaser Arafat’s Fatah, Habash’s Popular Front 
for the Liberation of Palestine, Samir Gloshch’s Palestinian Popular Struggle Front, and 
the Lebanese Communist Party.108 
After the 1950s leftist movements emerged more often than before. There were 
three main reasons of this development: first, World War II exhausted the male 
population in most countries, and so their armies faded correspondingly. Second, without 
foreign support, terrorist organizations could not survive for long because Western 
powers were dealing with their own problems. On the other hand, organizations 
continued to educate their followers ideologically and militarily in Palestine. During the 
War, Turkey was rather peaceful, except for some minor incidents on the Turkish Iranian 
border caused by the Barzani peshmargas.109 Third, after China exported guerilla-style 
fighting to Palestine, Palestine became an attraction center for the leftist organizations 
from all over the world, including Turkey.  
It was impossible to train PKK members in Lebanon or in Palestine without 
Syrian attention, since the Syrian dictatorial regime was controlling most parts of 
Lebanon, monitoring and supporting Palestinian organizations, as well. At first Syria 
view the existence of the PKK in the region suspiciously. Syrians were calculating the 
possibility that PKK could influence Syrian Kurds and become a prototype for the 
insurgency. However, Öcalan was aware of the situation and tried not to disturb Syrian 
sensitivities. Syria noticed that PKK would be a good instrument in her debate with 
Turkey because the Tigris-Euphrates water and Hatay issues were challenging both 
countries deeply. Both parties, Syria and the PKK, found common ground that Turkey’s 
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weakness was beneficial for them. El Mukhabarat (Syrian Intelligence Service) prepared 
ID cards with fake names in order to hide and protect PKK members from Turkey. 
Turkey was militarily more powerful and was a NATO member, so it was not possible to 
defeat Turkey in a conventional war. However, PKK could weaken it.110 
Assuming that Syria alone supported the PKK might be misleading because there 
was a more powerful country beside Syria that would also benefit from the downfall of 
Turkey. Turkey (including the Ottoman Empire) and Russia have been enemies for 
centuries. Russia had long desired to reach the Mediterranean Sea, and the only way to 
realize such an aspiration was to control Bosporus, but Turks controlled it. The “Sick 
man of Europe,” which once nearly lost Istanbul to the Russian Empire, managed to 
survive even WWI. However, the PKK gave Russia a second chance to weaken the 
Ankara government and become more effective in the region. A Turkish foreign ministry 
official declared:  
We have good reason to believe that the Russians are paying the bill for 
these guerrillas. It is easy for their agents to find a few hundred 
unemployed young men who will do this kind of thing for the sake of 
adventure. It only costs a few million dollars a year. It has a completely 
Marxist program. They can’t foment terrorism anywhere else in Turkey 
now, but in the southeast they can keep the fires burning in the hope of 
heating them up in the future.111  
Targeting a common enemy, Syria and Russia acted together on the PKK issue. 
While Syria gave place and training to the PKK; Russia supported the organization with 
money, weapons and ammunition.  
 BARZANI AND TALABANI B.
Barzani was an important figure who affected Turkish politics of the 1970s and 
had a major influence on Turkish leftist groups. The left stream of the illegal 
organizations was active in İstanbul and Ankara, as well as in several main towns in the 
‘East.’ These groups were influenced by the Kurdish armed struggle under Mustafa 
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Barzani’s KDP (Kurdistan Democratic Part) in the south more than by the Turkish 
socialist factions. The KDP imposed Kurdish nationalism on DDKO and TİP, two of the 
most important leftist and Kurdish nationalist organizations in Turkey. Certainly, the 
KDP was a role model for the PKK, as well.112 
International developments affected the Kurdish nationalist movement. Any 
Kurdish activities in Iraq, Iran or Syria were either motivating separatist wishes or armed 
struggle in Turkey. While the Talabani was active in Syria and Barzani in Iran, Molla 
Barzani became the Defense Minister of “Mehabat Kurdish Government,” established 
after the Soviet and the British forces left Iran. But the Kurdish state could not stand for 
long. Iran occupied and razed the country, and Barzani escaped to Iraq. He could not stay 
there for long and so passed to Russia where he lived for eleven years between 1947 and 
1958; the Soviets used Barzani against Arab countries until 1958.113 
After returning to Iraq, Barzani tried to organize the Kurds of Iran, Iraq, Syria and 
Turkey. He offered to gather and establish a “National Congress.” His suggestion could 
not gain approval; only his followers attended the assembly. On the other hand, he 
became partly successful in his armed struggle on the Turkish border.114 
Receiving support from Syria and securing the PKK bases, the PKK came back to 
Turkey. Öcalan wanted to sweep Kurdish and leftist groups and secure his party’s 
leadership in the Kurdish struggle. He easily accomplished the mission because the 1980 
military coup had eroded the leadership of the existing illegal organizations. Thus, groups 
fell apart, and many of their members became new recruits of the PKK. The groups 
serving Öcalan lacked harmony; consequently the PKK emerged as “number one” owing 
to the September 12 Coup.115 In the spring 1980, Kemal Pir guided nearly thirty militants 
to Turkey. The group recruited some new members from Siverek and sent them abroad to 
be trained.  
                                                
112  Ali Kemal O ̈zcan, Turkey’s Kurds : A Theoretical Analysis of the PKK and Abdullah O ̈calan 
(London ; New York, N.Y.: Routledge, 2006), 87.  
113 O ̈zcan, PKK (Ku ̈rdistan I ̇s ̧c ̧i Partisi) Tarihi, Ideolojisi, Ve Yo ̈ntemi, 17, 18. 
114 O ̈zcan, PKK (Ku ̈rdistan I ̇s ̧c ̧i Partisi) Tarihi, Ideolojisi, Ve Yo ̈ntemi, 15. 
115 Mango, Turkey and the War on Terror, 62–65. 
 51 
In July 1981 the PKK held its first Congress in Syria in which a Vietcong-style 
long-term strategy was accepted. The second congress took place in 1982. Its political 
and military program suggested three main points: 
• The armed struggle in Kurdistan depends on the targets of the political 
struggle. 
• The Kurdistan revolution is a national war of liberation which will begin 
against a strong enemy in a semi-feudal colony with weak forces. 
• The other name of this revolution is a ‘long-term popular war.’116  
Another key point of the congress was ‘the strategy and structure of the warfare’ 
in Kurdistan. The plan was to be carried out in three stages: strategic defense, strategic 
balance (balance of forces) and strategic offense periods. Additionally, the PKK would 
adopt three tactics: armed propaganda, guerilla and professional guerilla. And, a 
professional leadership would conduct this renovation. Abdullah Öcalan became the 
Secretary General of the Party and domestic central office, foreign central office and 
polit-bureau that made up the new Central Committee. “Following its incubation during 
the 1970s and after ample preparation, the PKK initiated a prolonged guerrilla war.”117 
The PKK officially started its armed struggle with two attacks in Şemdinli and Eruh on 
August 15, 1984.118  
 EUROPE C.
Despite the support from abroad, Öcalan demanded more backing. He sought 
especially financial aid, in order to be the most powerful organization and gain full 
control of the “Kurdish” territory. Thus, by hosting rich Turkish workers, Europe became 
another arena of the PKK. “The PKK receive[d] substantial financial support from the 
large Kurdish diaspora in Europe and from criminal activity there.”119 In 1981, a few 
militants were sent to Europe to organize the Kurdish population. Germany was easy to 
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penetrate; Syria maintained the required fake passports for the PKK members. Another 
way to enter European countries was by becoming a refugee “playing the atrocity game.” 
They were asking for asylum, and countries were accepting their demands without 
question. Terrorists were enjoying European hospitality. Old ones and newcomers, 
thousands of Kurds in Europe were the new targets of the PKK, and Öcalan benefited as 
well.120 
Although Western democracies were Turkey’s allies against communism’s threat 
during the Cold War, they involved terrorism indirectly by not taking effective measures 
to stop the PKK from finding refuge or collecting funds inside their countries. For 
example, the PKK could rely on contacts and accomplices among Turkish migrants in 
West Germany. “This goes some way to explaining the vast scale of the havoc it caused. 
When the support was withdrawn, the PKK collapsed.”121   
It is difficult to clarify the attitudes of Turkey’s NATO friends and allies to the 
Turkish public. NATO is supposed to serve as a serious base for the political 
independence and territorial integrity of Turkey. Yet, it is puzzling to understand the 
motivation behind letting the PKK engage in so-called democratic activities that are 
directed at Turkey’s security.  
“Turkey has ratified all thirteen international counterterrorism conventions, 
protocols, and resolutions adopted by the UN. Moreover, Turkey is a party to the 
European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism.”122 Consequently, Turkey 
supported the international war on terror that the U.S. started after the 9/11 terrorist 
attacks. Despite her cooperation, Turkey has never received the same understanding from 
European countries. 
While Palestine and Lebanon trained the militants, Russia supplied the weaponry, 
and Western countries supported the organization financially. Foreign support let the 
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PKK’s recover from the 1980 Coup and made it stronger than before. Members flocked 
to Turkey in small numbers, searching for suitable ground for the future cadre waiting 
outside of Turkey. By 1984, the PKK believed that they were ready to confront with 
Turkish security forces.  
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V. CONCLUSION 
 WHY PKK BUT NOT OTHERS? A.
Despite other leftist or Kurdish nationalist organizations’ failures, the PKK’s 
ability to survive and grow stronger was made possible by its ability to notice 
developments inside and outside of Turkey in time. In order to fully understand the 
PKK’s philosophy, one has to look at the factors that shaped Abdullah Öcalan’s mindset 
because he was the architect of the PKK’s ideology. It was unthinkable to judge his 
decisions or to differ from his views in the party. His childhood, ambitions, loneliness in 
big cities, search for identity, and excessive personal confidence are the factors that 
contributed to his way of thinking. 
However, it would not have been possible for Öcalan to create his organization if 
the political instability of 1970s and 1980s had not assisted him. While military coups 
“managed” to take illegal organizations under control, peace did not last for long. 
Actually, these groups were suppressed but never completely erased; thus when they 
found a suitable atmosphere, they re-emerged with more power. The 1971 and 1980 
coups affected the PKK much more than the others; on the other hand, Öcalan and a 
group of terrorists managed to leave Turkey just before the coups. After a period of 
training and reorganizing outside of Turkey ended, the PKK returned as a more 
professional and powerful organization. The military coups and coalition governments 
created a vast area of instability in which the PKK could flourish.  
Another factor that helped the PKK’s development was the Turkish government’s 
unpreparedness. “Unlike the terror-ridden years of the late 1960s and early 1970s, this 
time [1980s] it was not urban violence that led to rural activities but the other way 
around. Instead of the resurrection of armed activities in major cities, as some of 
Turkey’s professional terrorism experts had predicted, the country was confronted by a 
totally different security crisis. This time it was characterized by vicious attacks 
concentrating on the local people of the backward Southeast region, where about half of 
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Turkey’s ten million Kurds live.”123 In addition, believing that military measures 
destroyed all separatist movements, Ankara could not estimate the coming attacks of the 
PKK in 1984. Thus, the beginnings of the organization went somewhat unnoticed by 
Turkish officials, and when it was noticed, Ankara labeled the PKK ‘a bunch of bandits.’  
Despite the speculations that the Turkish government intentionally ignored the 
development of the PKK, Öcalan gives an adequate answer to the phenomenon: 
In reality, in those days we were not an organization that should be taken 
into account. Now that the PKK developed today, everybody is asking 
‘Why was it not crushed [?]’ But at that time, it was not so perilous that 
even I could not estimate that it would be so dangerous for the enemy. 
Even I could not guess that the PKK would manage to develop so much, 
how could the enemy guess and why should it acquire a big measure to the 
thing that it didn’t know.124  
“The [PKK] offensive [of 15 August 1984] later considered to be the ‘29th 
revolt,’ which would be smashed in weeks or months just like the preceding 28 attempts. 
The most recent revolt, ‘the 28th,’ had taken place in Dersim province in 1937 to 1938 
and was over in less than six months—the longest one to date.”125 It was believed that the 
PKK would face the same fate as the other leftist and separatist organizations; after the 
coup army crushed them so successfully they could not show up once more. This 
organization was Marxist like many others, but they were using rural areas not cities as 
their base. Southeastern Anatolia, in particular, was not easy for the government to 
control; its rugged terrain was unknown to the conventional army. Although the Turkish 
gendarmerie had been stationed in those areas, they were small in number and not ready 
for a guerilla war.  
But how did the PKK manage not only to be the leading organization of Kurdish 
separatists but also the Middle East’s bloodiest terrorist movement? “The organization 
has managed to expand its structure from a 12-man gathering in 1970s to the present 
10,000-plus armed force of the early 1990s.” Many people believe that “had Ankara 
                                                
123 I ̇smet G. I ̇mset, The PKK : A Report on Separatist Violence in Turkey, 1973–1992 (Kavaklıdere, 
Ankara: Turkish Daily News, 1992). 
124 Öcalan, Kucuk, Dirilis, 70. 
125 O ̈zcan, PKK (Ku ̈rdistan I ̇s ̧c ̧i Partisi) Tarihi, Ideolojisi, Ve Yo ̈ntemi, 84.  
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taken serious and economic measures in that period [after the 1980 Coup] to accompany 
the military crackdown, acknowledging the nature of the terrorist-separatist movements 
in the Southeast, this so-called ‘party’ would never have come to the point of enjoying 
the vast popular support it has in the troubled region.”126  
Öcalan controlled the group tightly, making members appear to act like his 
private army of gangsters rather than politically motivated terrorists. Accordingly, 
brutality followed the dictatorship. The PKK did not grant the opposition even the right 
to live, believing that ‘if you are not with us, you must be with government’ and 
punishing any group or people who refused to cooperate. Without any rival or resistance 
from villagers, the group expanded daily. In addition, the PKK also took account of 
changes inside Turkey and in the world, and took the necessary steps to survive 
accordingly.  
The PKK’s ability to stay underground by not publishing any newspapers or 
pamphlets prevented security forces from recognizing the scale of their activities.127 In 
addition, “[f]acts have shown that the over-confidence of the government back in the 
early 1980s only served to help the PKK through its days abroad of intensive preparation 
for launching attacks on Turkey.”128 Doubtless, foreign support was another key factor 
that helped PKK’s development. “Certain foreign powers and their treacherous 
collaborators at home who knew that their deviant ideologies could not ever come to 
power in Turkey through democratic channels, planned to create a climate of violence in 
the country.”129 The Soviets used Bulgaria and Syria as bases to supply terrorists with 
weapons and training. In addition, Syria, and Bulgaria, Iraq, Greece, and many western 
powers always backed the PKK, and used it as a tool to dictate their wishes to Turkey. 
PKK militants were constantly welcomed by these states.  
To sum up, Turkey’s politics, Abdullah Öcalan himself, and the support of 
foreign countries as a whole transformed the PKK from an idealistic group of students to 
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a violent terrorist organization. Disunity of the coalition governments prevented Ankara 
from undertaking precautions against the growing terrorist threat. Military coups let 
illegal organizations develop, while radicalizing them by blocking the democratic means 
to express their demands. Öcalan’s oppression eliminated rival groups, and under his 
dictatorship, even members of his own group who dared to criticize his decisions faced 
death. Fear and despair kept the members under control and made them obey his 
commands without judging. Thus, unity and absolute obedience among members lead the 
PKK to success. International leftist movements’ effects on illegal organizations, 
neighbor countries’ complicity, Russia’s arms aid and European countries’ reluctance to 
take action against PKK activities on their lands helped PKK’s development and left 
Turkey alone with the organization. At the end, the PKK became the most violent 




APPENDIX. KURDISH ORGANIZATIONS IN TURKEY  
(1970–1992)130 
 KURDISH ORGANIZATIONS A.
1. SIVANCILAR 
DESCRIPTION: Kurdish group. Formerly pro-Soviet and has active links with 
Talabani. Reportedly had links with TKP and IGD as well. Named after the false name, 
Sivan, used by the group’s leader Doctor Sait Kirmizitoprak. 
ESTABLISHED: It was formally established in 1972 when the Sivancilar Group 
broke away from the TKDP, although it had been active as a group within the TKDP and 
DDKO since the mid-1960s. 
SUMMARY: An active, Kurdish group. Its founder is Dr.Sait Kirmizitoprak who 
drew supporters from TKDP and DDKO. It supported Masoud Barzani’s Kurdistan 
Democrat Party until its defeat in 1975. It changed allegiance to the Patriotic Union of 
Talabani and became his supporter in Turkey.  
2. TKDP TURKIYE KURDISTANI DEMOKRAT PARTISI (Kurdish 
Democratic Party of Turkey) 
ESTABLISHED: Accounts differ on the date of establishment. It seems to have 
been formally established in 1965, but its activities began early in the 1950s. It was 
crushed following the September 1980 coup. 
SUMMARY: The Turkish branch of the Kurdistan Democratic Party. The best 
known of the Kurdish parties in Eastern Turkey of the 1960‒1970 period. Its strength has 
been sapped by dissension and subsequent splits within the party. The defeat of Barzani 
in Iraq in 1925 produced conflict within the party especially on its position vis-a-vis the 
former Soviet Union. Party decisions were made in the form of meetings to evaluate 
proposals and demands extended to the Central Committee by following a hierarchical 
series beginning with the cell. The hierarchical series was followed again with the 
                                                
130  This section is prepared by using I ̇smet G. I ̇smet, The PKK: A Report on Separatist Violence in 
Turkey, 1973–1992 (Kavaklıdere, Ankara: Turkish Daily News, 1992), 370–450. 
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decisions being communicated from the Central Committee to the cells. Within the 
organization a total practice of democracy was planned, every member had, as he 
conformed with the decisions made by any organ, the right to criticize them and present 
alternative proposals. If it is necessary to schematize the TKPs organizational structure, it 
takes the form of Congress-General Secretary-Politburo-Central Committee-Village 
Committee and cell. 
3. DDKO DEVRIMCI DOGU KULTUR OCAKLARI (Revolutionary 
Eastern Culture Clubs) 
ESTABLISHED: In 1969 a group of Eastern youths broke away from the TIP and 
established the DDKO. They quickly organized and opened offices in virtually every 
town and city in Eastern Turkey. 
DESCRIPTION: Kurdish. No longer exists in viable form. Many members joined 
the DDKD - Devrimci Demokratik Kultur Dernegi in the 1970s. 
SUMMARY: The group’s members were said to be socialist or even 
revolutionary but they appeared very (Kurdish) nationalist. A section of the DDKO was 
influenced by the Sivancilar group and joined in it when it broke away from the TKDP. 
Virtually all of the members joined the DDKD when it was formed in 1975. 
4. DDKD DEVRIMCI DEMOKRATIK KULTUR DERNEKLERI (The 
Revolutionary Culture Associations) 
ESTABLISHED: Established in 1975 by former members of the DDKD and 
several other groups (including the Sivancilar group). 
DESCRIPTION: It no longer exists. 
SUMMARY: The Turkish Worker’s Party (TIP), which was set up after 1961, 
also consisted of the Kurdish and Turkish left. In setting up the legal organization, the 
Revolutionary Democratic Culture Clubs (DDKO), these groups became involved in 
secessionist activities. As a result of these activities they were arrested after 12 March 
1971, but some were acquitted on lack of evidence and others were released under the 
general amnesty granted in 1974. Thus, the founding members of the DDKO met and 
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established the DDKD in 1975. The DDKD gained many sympathizers during the illegal 
activities it pursued under the appearance of legality before 12 September 1980. For 
DDKD history, policies, influence and publications, see Sivancilar.  
5. PPKK KURDISTAN ONCU ISCI PARTISI (Kurdistan Avant-garde 
Workers’ Party) 
ESTABLISHED: February 1983. 
SUMMARY: Since the 12 September 1980 Coup, military coup, the PPKK 
(Kurdistan Oncu Isci Partisi, Pariya Pesenga Karkeren Kurdistan, has been an extension 
of the DDKD (Revolutionary Democratic Culture Association), which was organized 
legally in provinces and towns in the Southeastern region, and which had its central 
office in Diyarbakir. It took this new name after February 1983. The PPKK stretches 
back to the 1970s (as the DDKO) and is mentioned within the Kurdish movements as the 
“pesheng.” M.Ali Cilgin, who lives abroad, was known to be the last general secretary. In 
1980s, they continued secretly selling and distributing regular monthly editions of their 
magazine, Pesheng, in the Southeastern region of Turkey.    
After 1987, there arose within the Pesheng formation a wing arguing for an armed 
radical struggle. After a quarrel within the organization, a portion of this opposition 
crossed over to the ranks of the PKK. Within this opposition, there is a group that set 
forth different views. The workers’ associations linked to this party that are organized 
abroad continue to publish an organ called Armanc. 
6. TKSP Turkish Kurdistan socialist Party (Ozgurluk Yolu) 
ESTABLISHED: Founded in 1975 by group of supporters.    
DESCRIPTION: Kurdish, formerly pro-Moscow group. 
SUMMARY: This group was established in 1975 by former TIP members. Its 
ranks were swollen in 1976 when a group of DDKD supporters broke away to join it. In 
late 1977 the Ozgurluk Yolu group established the DHKD (Revolutionary People’s 
Cultural Associations) in several provinces in Eastern Turkey and began using these 
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associations to try to extend its influence. It was active through DHKDs in the 1970s and 
later took the name of TKSP. 
INFLUENCE: It was very effective before the PKK. Its supporters were youths or 
intellectuals from the Bingol, Diyarbakir and Van areas. They were also active through 
the TOB-DER framework. 
7. KAWA (Legendry Name of a Kurdish Hero) 
ESTABLISHED: 1976 when a group of supporters broke away it from the 
DDKD. 
DESCRIPTION: Kurdish group, formerly anti-Soviet and anti-Maoist. 
SUMMARY: KAWA emerged in 1976 when a group of DDKD members 
disagreed with the rest of the party over their relations with the Soviet Union (KAWA 
declared the USSR a social imperialist country). It was established when Ahmet Zeki 
Okcuoglu, a member of the Ankara Revolutionary Democratic Culture Association 
(AYOD) and a suspected member of the Revolutionary Eastern Culture Club (DDKO), 
set up a publishing house in Istanbul and called it Kawa. The group later split (1977) into 
the Denge Kawa and Kawa Redciler groups following debates on Mao’s Three World 
theory. 
8. DENGE KAWA (Voice of the KAWA) 
ESTABLISHED: 1977, when the pro-Maoist group broke away from KAWA.  
SUMMARY: Formed in 1977 when supporters of Mao’s Three World theory 
broke away from KAWA following debates on validity of this theory. They published a 
magazine called Denge Kawa and adopted the same name for their group.  
Both these groups [Sivancilar and Ozgurluk Yolu] and the PKK have clashed 
violently with Denge Kawa in the past. 
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9. RED KAWA OR KAWA REDCILER (The Kawa Rejectionists) 
ESTABLISHED: 1978 by anti-Maoist group in KAWA. 
DESCRIPTION: Kurdish group, anti-Soviet and anti-Maoist. See entry on 
“KAWA” as Kawa Redciler [is] the direct descendants of this group. 
10. RIZGARI (LIBERATION) 
FOUNDED: Formed in 1977 by a group who broke away from DDKD. 
DESCRIPTION: Kurdish group which was mildly pro-Soviet. 
SUMMARY: Prior to 12 March 1971 the Rizgari group were members of TIP. 
They left TIP to join the DDKD when it was formed, they broke away and join with other 
groups. As a result in 1977 they established the legal ASDK-DER (Anti-Colonist 
Democratic Cultural Association) which they tried to promote amongst the Southeast 
youth. In April 1979 the Rizgari group split when the Al Rizgari group broke away.  
11. ALA RIZGARI (Red Liberation) 
FOUNDED: March 1979 when a group broke away from Rizgari. 
DESCRIPTION: Kurdish Group, pro-Talabani and pro-Soviet. 
SUMMARY: Following differences within Rizgari over Talabani and Soviet 
Union a group calling itself ALA RIZGAZGARI broke away. The split was very bitter 
and resulted in several killings. While the Komal publishing house and magazine remains 
in Rizgari’s control, the majority of the ASDK-DER associations followed Ala Rizgari. A 
propaganda war subsequently broke out between the two groups. Prior to the publication 
of its own magazine in June 1979 the Ala Rizgari group split and a strong pro-Soviet 




12. KUK KURDISTAN ULUSAL KURTULUSCULARI (Kurdistan 
National Liberationists)  
ESTABLISHED: Established in 1978 by former members of Turkiye KDP.  
DESCRIPTION: Was of pro-Soviet but anti-Talabani origin. 
SUMMARY: Following the defeat tot Barzani in 1975, a pro-Soviet group 
describing itself as KUK emerged In the TKDP. It eventually broke away from the party 
in 1978 taking a fair degree of support with it. They regarded themselves as true 
representatives of the KDP and supported the struggle of the Iraqi KDP. At present it 
maintains close relations with the TKSP and continues to oppose the PKK. 
13. AKSA The European Union of Kurdistan and Youth 
ESTABLISHED: 1956, East Berlin. 
SUMMARY: The organization was set up by supporters of Jalal Talabani and 
became active in Frankfurt as a result of differences of opinion that emerged between the 
supporters of Talabani and Mullah Mustafa Barzani in the European Society of Kurdish 
Students, which became active in East Berlin in 1956. The organization had centers in 
London and Heidelberg. It also had branches in Hungary, Sweden, Britain, Germany and 
Belgium. Its publication was the Roja Kurdistan (the Kurdistan Sun). The organization 
changed its name to AKSA (the European Union of Kurdistan and Youth) at its ordinary 
congress held in Berlin in 1982. There were more Iraqi, Iranian and Syrian·nationals than 
Turkish citizens in positions of power within the .administration of this organization. Its 
aim was to set up an anti-colonialist, anti-fascist, anti-chauvinist, anti-racist Kurdistan in 
the areas densely populated by Kurdish people.  
14. BAHOZ Kurdistan struggle Association 
ESTABLISHED: 1970 Sweden  
SUMMARY: Bahoz is an organization which was set up on January 3, 1970. 
From the point of view of the word, Bahoz means “whirlwind” or “tornado,” and it is the 
same name of the Komela Tekoseren Kurdistan (the Kurdistan Struggle Association). 
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Anter Anter and Bedirhan Anter are among its founder members. It is known to have 
aimed to achieve unity togetherness and solidarity among Kurdish students.  
15. BIRKOM Anti-fascist Unity Committee Abroad 
ESTABLISHED: 1982 as a joint terror front. 
SUMMARY: Members of the Revolutionary Path (Dev Yol) PKK, Turkish Labor 
Party, Socialist Homeland (Vatan) Party abroad met on 3 March 1982 and set up Birkom. 
It was been observed to be in close cooperation with other subversive organizations in 
West Germany, in particular, and trying to secure funds. In 1983, it was seen to organize 
activities such as· protest marches as well as hunger strikes and occupations of buildings 
in Europe· It was also known to be in solidarity with such organizations as Dev-Genc 
(Revolutionary Youth), DIP, FAK; lsci Gercegi (Worker’s Truth), Kawa, Komkar, 
Tekosin and Partizan.  
16. FEYKA The Federation of Kurdistan Patriotic Workers’ Cultural 
Unions 
ESTABLISHED: 1984, Cologne, Germany. 
SUMMARY: The organization is a federation set up by as many as fifteen pro-
Kurdish associations in the German city of Cologne on 21 March 1984, and serves as the 
PKK’s mask in Europe. It has been observed to have spread rapidly throughout Europe, 
having organized in particular in France and also in Holland, Belgium, Switzerland, 
Sweden and Denmark. It has been known to convince citizens of Eastern Anatolian origin 
in Europe about the rightness of their cause and to send them to Turkey to engage in 
activities after first sending them to Western countries and to Syria, in particular, to 
receive theoretical and practical training. Feyka aims to set up an independent Kurdish 
state, to increase PKK’s membership and sources of income, to establish a political base 
and educate that which exists, as well as to transfer funds to the PKK. 
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17. KKEP Kurdistan Communist Party of Labor  
ESTABLISHED: 1982 in Syria. 
SUMMARY: The outlawed Turkish Communist Labor Party, which collapsed 
after the 12 September 1980 military operations, held its second general congress on 14 
April 1982 in Syria. Addressing the conference the organization’s leader, Teslim Tore, 
put forward some proposals that were adopted. 
In this way, the decision was made to set up a new organization to be called the 
Kurdistan Communist Party of Labor (KKEP), with the aim of securing the right of the 
Kurdish nation in the “Kurdistan region” of Turkey freely to determine their own destiny 
after a communist regime had been set up to replace the existing constitutional regime in 
Turkey, which would be brought down by general force of arms. 
18. TEKOSIN (STRUGGLE) 
SUMMARY: Tekosin is a 1970s group that left the Kurtulus movement, with a 
magazine of the same name: Tekosin. It is an organization formed by those who came 
together having left different movements, particularly in the Southeast. They have a very 
limited following abroad. They have good relations with the PPKK and even better ones 
with the TKSP. It has no weight at all within the Kurdish movement. In parallel with the 
activities carried out after the 1974 amnesty by the outlawed group of THKP/C, the 
Tekosin organization was set up in line with Marxist/Leninist principles, by a group of 
militants who took up the Kurdish question in 1978 and argued that the Kurds were a 
separate nation, that an Independent state of Kurdistan should be established, and that an 
organization should be formed on the principles of Kurdish nationalism. It has its center 
in the city of Tunceli. Tekosin aimed to carry out military political, regional and rural 
work to start an armed uprising in the eastern and southeastern Anatolian regions by 
achieving the support of the revolutionary democrats in Turkey. The end result of an 
armed movement, it argued, would be to create an independent socialist state of 
Kurdistan in Turkey and after that to unite in the struggle with the Kurdish organizations 
in other parts of the region. 
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19. TKP (B): YKK Patriotic Kurdistan Communists 
SUMMARY: The YKK (Patriotic Kurdistan Communists) was an organization, 
established by Ibrahim Seven, the general secretary of the TKP(B), and the members of 
which received training in the Bakaa Valley in Lebanon in order to be able to wage an 
independent armed struggle in the East and Southeast where the PKK was active. It is 
referred to, in official documents, as an organization that will eventually enter into 
actions within the country. Although no clear actions of the organization have been 
observed to date, official documents say it supports the PKK. 
20. YEKBUN (Birlik-Union)  
SUMMARY: The Yekbun is known to be an illegal separatist organization that 
was set up on the initiative of Pasa Uzun and Mahmut Cikman, who left the DDKD in 
May of 1979. The organization chose the provinces and towns of Siverek, Urfa, Mardin, 
Derik, Kiziltepe, Bitlis and Diyarbakir as its area of activities. It has had links with the 
illegal organizations Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan (PKK: Kurdistan Workers’ Party) and 
Ala Rizgari. Its publication is Yekbun magazine. The organization was known to be 
carrying out armed activities in Southeastern Anatolia toward realizing a democratic 
people’s war to liberate the Turkish part of lands they call Kurdistan. It aimed to begin an 
armed struggle against the Turkish Armed Forces, which they consider as obstructive 
elements, as well as against local feudalism and “United States imperialism.” 
 MARXIST ORGANIZATIONS IN TURKEY (1970–1992) B.
1. THE TURKISH PEOPLES’ LIBERATION PARTY AND FRONT 
(THKP-C) MOVEMENTS: 
The Turkiye Halk Kurtulus Partisi ve Cephesi (THKP-C) or the Turkish Peoples’ 
Liberation Party and Front was a military extension of the Dev-Genc organization. The 
Dev-Genc was a popular student movement in 1960s. On the other hand, THKP-C could 
not show presence between 1972 and 1975, an era known as “a period of inactivity for 
the THKP-C.” The Kizildere Operation, in which THKP-C took a Canadian and two 
British technicians as hostages, was a turning point in THKP-C’s history. The police 
crushed the operation, and many leaders of the organization were either killed or arrested. 
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Both the Kizildere incident and the period of inactivity triggered criticism within the 
organization, so the THKP-C’s dissolution process began.  
The THKP-C related terror organizations which have come into existence in 
Turkey, some of which are still believed to be operational, include: 
• THKP/C-MLSPB (Devrimci Kurtulus) 
• THKP/C-Cephe Yolu 
• THKP/C·Cayan Sempatizanlari 
• THKP/C-Kasabalilar 
• THKP/C-Acilciler 
• THKP/C-Devrimci Savas 
• THKP/C-HDO 
• THKP/C-Partizan. 
• THKP/C- Eylem Birligi (Devrimci Kurtulus) 
• THKP/C-DKB 




• THKP/C-Kurtulus (TKKKO) 
• THKP/C-D.Halkin Yolu (TKIH) 
Having different names and cadres, all these organizations believe in the necessity 
of armed propaganda to achieve a national democratic revolution in Turkey. Many of 
these groups were ended with the 12 September 1980 Military Coup. Unlike the PKK, 
THKP-C extensions mostly target political or high-ranking officers in metropolitan areas 
rather than fighting with security forces in rural areas. Thus, their activities are small-
scale but influential.  
2. THE TURKISH COMMUNIST PARTY-MARXIST LENINIST 
(TKP/ML) MOVEMENTS 
The Turkish Communist Party-Marxist Leninist (TKP/ML) is the second most 
active and dangerous leftist organization following the Dev-Yol. Its extensions are still 
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active both in urban and rural areas and target political figures as well as security forces 
in Turkey. 
The TKP/ML family, which is as divided as the THKP-C over personal and 
political disputes, has taken various forms and names over the past years which may 




• TKP/ML DABK 
• TKP/MLGKK 
• TKP/ML-Partizan 






3. THE PEOPLES’ LIBERATION ARMY OF TURKEY (THKO) 
MOVEMENTS 
The THKO is the third major leftist illegal organization in Turkey. It is mostly 
active in urban areas, and its violence is felt in the streets of major cities. Huseyin Inan, 
the party leader, describes their strategy as: 
The THKO believes that the people’s freedom, and the independence of 
this country can only be won with armed struggle, and this is the only 
way. Our goal is to wipe out America and all foreign enemies to destroy 
the traitors and to create a fully independent Turkey which has been 
cleared of enemies. 
Like the Dev-Yol and the THKP-C, the THKO fell apart and created many new 
factions, such as: 
• THKO (D.Gezmis) 
• TDKP/IO 
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• HALKIN KURTULUSU   
• THKO/MB 







After examining Kurdish separatists and the Marxist Leninist leftist organization, 
one can recognize that most of them were established before PKK’s emergence. In 
addition, they were supported by great powers like the Soviet Union and European 
countries. Syria, Lebanon, Iraq and Iran played crucial roles in their rise and 
development. They took advantage of student activities and enjoyed military coups and 
political instability that created the chaotic environment of Turkey in 1960s and 1980s, as 
did the PKK. They had hundreds of members whereas the PKK was only a group of 
people gathering at picnics or in small houses in Ankara at the time.  
The PKK can be distinguished from other organizations by its unique ability to 
adapt to Turkey’s and the world’s changing environment. While many organizations were 
competing with each other to be known by their publications, the PKK stayed silent and 
did not print any document publicly until 1984. By remaining silent131 the PKK was able 
to develop slowly but successfully without being disturbed by security forces. The PKK 
suppressed its rivals one by one if they were unwilling to share their territory. Threatened 
or killed by the PKK, other organizations left the rural areas to the PKK. Some of them 
cooperated, but these alliances continued only as long as the PKK benefited from them.  
The 12 September 1980 Coup harmed the PKK as well as others; however, before 
the Coup, unlike other groups’ leaders, Abdullah Öcalan was able to flee to Syria and 
                                                
131 The PKK did not publish any journals or brochures unlike other illegal organizations. By this way 
the PKK became unique because making propaganda and recruiting new members was a popular trend 
among illegal organization. Thus, security forces could not notice PKK’s activities for a long time. 
 71 
prepare proper conditions for his comrades. Öcalan used foreign support to train excising 
members in Bekaa and financed his organization from European funds. While many 
illegal organizations stayed undercover with the horror of 1980 Coup, Öcalan started an 
armed struggle as soon as he gained enough power. Thus, the PKK emerged as the 
leading terrorist organization after 1980. Taking necessary actions on schedule and 
threatening rivals and the Kurdish people, the PKK became the most dangerous terrorist 
organization in Turkey. 
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